Prepared for NGO Committee on Disarmament, June 27, 1997

Prerequisites to Global Nuclear Disarmament (GND)

D.C. Whitmore

Many recognize nuclear weapons abolition is likely to result from a step-wise process rather than be achieved as a singular event. However, the disarmament process may lack serious commitment by the nuclear powers until certain prerequisites are satisfied. These prerequisites are defined as conditions which must be in place before global nuclear disarmament (GND) becomes feasible within the foreseeable future. A further constraint is that all prerequisites must be satisfied before successful completion of the GND process can be reasonably assured. Meaningful commitment by all existing and emergent nuclear powers to forswear possession of nuclear arms will require fundamental changes in the defense and security policies of those nations. Thus, it follows that GND prerequisites are conditions that are necessary in order to bring about those policy changes.

Identification and description of GND prerequisites are largely a matter of opinion, but the following conditions are postulated as necessary to achieve nuclear abolition in the foreseeable future:

Abolition Strategy. The strategy of confrontation with the nuclear powers must be redirected to one of persuasion. Further, abolition proposals must be consistent with realistic expectations.

Abolition Rationale. A persuasive case for GND must be made which contains convincing arguments on all relevant issues.

Non-Nuclear States Commitment. A large majority of non-nuclear states must make clear the unacceptability of a protracted GND process and be willing to give GND priority over economic and political self-interests.

Public Debate. The GND issue must be elevated through pubic debates of such duration and intensity that national policies on nuclear arms are fully challenged.

Each of these general prerequisites is now discussed in some detail.

Current efforts to push nuclear weapon states towards nuclear abolition center on the strategy of confronting them with the obligation to honor their treaty commitments, especially Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This strategy is failing for at least four reasons: (1) The nuclear powers have different interpretations on their treaty obligations and performance against those obligations; (2) The nuclear powers assert that nuclear arsenals remain essential for international peace and security; (3) The nuclear powers are not being pressed to change their nuclear policies; and (4) The nuclear powers are not acknowledging positive incentives to disarm. In short, the nuclear states are not being persuaded to disarm.

A persuasion strategy would recognize that confrontation without convincing leverage does not work, and will not work, in a global community of independent sovereignties. Rather, it would recognize the only practical motivation for changing national policies is in acknowledged, self-interest gains. GND advocates have yet to make the case. Continuation of the confrontation strategy only delays the day when the real disarmament process begins.

Another necessary shift in abolition strategy is towards more realistic expectations. It is self-defeating to set unrealistic goals, such as the abolition of war as an attendant condition for successful nuclear disarmament. Achievement of an abolition treaty by year 2000 (goal set in April, 1995) is highly unrealistic, given the difficulties of negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in which there was already consensus among parties (consensus on nuclear abolition remains a distant possibility).

It is also self-defeating to believe serious progress is being made towards nuclear abolition on the basis of such events as the World Court decision (having ambiguous impact) and Canberra Commission report (authoritative nuclear disarmament proposals have been made since the 1940s). Serious progress is not being made and it is counterproductive to believe otherwise. Despair and pessimism are also not warranted, but abolition expectations and proposals should be subjected to reality checks.

As stated earlier, GND advocates have yet to make the case. Bits and pieces are here and there, but profound changes in nuclear arms policies will most likely require a strong intellectual foundation. The perceived gains in security through nuclear deterrence will not be given-up lightly. Many issues need to be resolved before serious progress towards nuclear abolition can be realistically expected. Abolition waits for a strong case.

There are several major dimensions to a nuclear abolition rationale. Each is a spoke in the wheel justifying abolition and each spoke is reinforced by a bundle of supporting arguments. One major spoke is the positive benefits that accrue from nuclear disarmament, such as, (1) regime to minimize proliferation and nuclear terrorism risks, (2) contribution to regional security regimes, (3) accidental war risk reduction, (4) immediate and long-term cost savings, and (5) improved resource utilization.

The GND justification wheel should go well beyond the list of positive benefits and encompass all issues that likely bear on reaching GND consensus. Thus, another major spoke is nuclear deterrence theory and how it degrades, rather than bolsters, national and global security. A third spoke could be labeled nuclear weapons policy and supporting considerations include tactical military utility; 1st use; launch risk reduction; new warhead research and testing; etc.

Additional spokes in the rationale wheel could address the derivation of security and defense requirements; ballistic missile defense; nuclear-free zones; conventional arms control; other weapons of mass destruction; enhancements to nonproliferation regime; abolition treaty verification; regional security measures; United Nations role; etc. Much work remains to be done to build a strong case for nuclear abolition. The principal theme of the rationale should be to demonstrate that the nuclear powers have more to gain from GND than to lose. It should be unquestionably persuasive.

In brief, the rationale prerequisite is the "homework assignment" for the GND advocate community and its satisfactory accomplishment is absolutely necessary to help ensure undelayed abolition.

A solid intellectual foundation for nuclear abolition is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for success. Given the realities of power dynamics in the international community, the nuclear powers may resist expedited GND unless led to understand that their choice is between painful alternatives. This dynamic is more often the rule than the exception and it has been frequently exploited by the nuclear powers in pressing its agenda, e.g., at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The non-nuclear states need to rise to this challenge.

Solidarity among the non-nuclear states is especially necessary for traversing the political minefield represented by the mix of declared nuclear powers, de facto powers, and emergent powers. A tight coalition of highly-committed nations should be a formidable force, especially if also equipped with a voting majority in the U.N. General Assembly. However, if the commitments to GND are not underpinned by determined willingness to accept economic and political consequences, the coalition will likely have hollow effect. A good place to begin flexing coalition muscles is at the upcoming NPT PrepComs.

Future prospects for nuclear weapons abolition are perhaps more in the hands of the non-nuclear states than in the nuclear states.

A strong abolition rationale and determined commitments by the non-nuclear states are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for GND success. Changes in national security policies may well depend on consensus within both governing legislative bodies and the general public. Public debate can be a major instrument for reaching consensus. The situation would likely vary between the nuclear powers but even public debate within one nation might be at least monitored, if not parroted, in other nations.

GND advocates, everywhere, need to start a "drumbeat" for reducing nuclear arsenals at an accelerated rate. The debate venue could vary from local community halls, to the floors of Parliament, to the Internet, to letters-to-the-editor, to TV talk shows, etc. As the abolition rationale becomes better established and as the commitments of the non-nuclear states become more apparent, the public debate may escalate to a noticeable scale. The debate can cut across all the issues addressed by the abolition rationale. Synergism between the efforts to satisfy the GND prerequisites should be a catalyst for building momentum towards abolition.

Conclusion

A global movement towards eliminating nuclear arsenals has been underway for many years and the goal has become more hopeful in the post-Cold War period. Still, progress towards abolition seems halting and the path strewn with daunting obstacles. Those obstacles can surely be overcome if all prerequisites to abolition are successfully satisfied. First, there must be agreement on the prerequisites. Second, there must be commitment to pursue their achievement. The challenge is before us.