The nuclear weapon powers, led by the United States, Russia, and China, have been quietly making profound changes to their nuclear policies and arsenals. Evidence mounts to suspect nuclear disarmament will continue to be a distant goal well into this century. Current program activities and future plans reveal priority attention to long-term maintenance and improvement of nuclear arsenals. Meanwhile, prospects for deep cuts appear ever more dim as arms control negotiations grind to a halt. This situation stands in stark contrast to Article VI obligations under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Now, the NPT regime faces an uncertain future as the 2005 NPT Review Conference approaches.
What is going on?
In a story reported by the Los Angeles Times on December 6, 2004, Russia continues to stress the importance of its nuclear arsenal. A stated motivation is to offset weaknesses in conventional military forces needed to deter strategic threats. While this story is likely accurate, it overlooks the role of new U.S.-Russia nuclear rivalry. The action-reaction dynamics that fueled the "Cold War" arms race continue to this day.
Origins of the new nuclear competition are not difficult to pinpoint. A former Los Alamos Laboratory employee, Dr. Stephen M. Younger, articulated rationale for a whole new class of nuclear weapons in a June, 2000 document. The Pentagon formally embraced this new doctrine in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) publicly disclosed in March, 2002.
For Russia's part, a prime stimulus for nuclear rearmament was U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Russia announced June 14, 2002 that it was no longer bound to START II . A "snapshot" overview of race status in April, 2005 is provided by two charts: "Nuclear Rearmament, Not Disarmament" (available at http://www.abolishnukes.com/charts/nuclear_rearmament.html or click here); and "Nuclear Arsenals Have Long Future" (available at http://www.abolishnukes.com/charts/2005_npt_review_p4.html or click here)
Nuclear rearmament programs of all nuclear weapon states (NWS) are each described under Section 3.0. However, before examining these lengthy details it might be well to consider two questions of context:
(a) What are legal obligations of NWS to give nuclear disarmament priority over nuclear rearmament? and (b) How is nuclear rearmament driven by official national security policies? Both questions relate to whether nuclear rearmament is justified.
This section describes (1) improvements being made to nuclear weapons systems already deployed in the arsenals of declared nuclear weapon states and (2) next-generation weapon system plans and developments. To the extent that information is available in the open literature, the breakout is by weapon type: land-based missiles; nuclear submarines; submarine missiles; strategic bombers and nuclear warheads.
Although portions of the U.S. nuclear arsenal are being retired (due to age and/or technical obsolescence) many deployed systems are being replaced by improved models or are undergoing modernization upgrades.
Land-based Missiles. MX is scheduled for "retirement" by October, 2005. MX silos are being retained rather than destroyed, as would have been required under the now defunct START II. MX missiles will be retained in a reserve force for potential redeployment or other missions, as part of the NPR "hedge" reserve. Minuteman III missiles are being fitted with more powerful W78 warheads and more accurate MK-12 A reentry vehicles under a 6-part, $6 billion program to improve Minuteman III accuracy and reliability and extend service life beyond 2020.
Nuclear Submarines. The service life of Trident nuclear submarines has been extended from 30 to 44 years. Tridents are being upgraded to replace Trident I C4 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with more accurate Trident II D5 model SLBMs.
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). Five more Trident D5s were purchased in FY 2005 and D5 production through 2013 will raise purchase orders from 390 to 540. Existing missiles will be replaced by a new variant, the D5LE, to extend SLBM service life through 2042.
Strategic Bombers. A 5-year upgrade of B-2s to carry a diverse mix of weapons was completed in 2003. The venerable B-52 has been periodically updated over its 50-plus year history. Two types of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles can be launched from B-52s and both types are currently undergoing modifications to extend service life through 2030.
Nuclear Warheads. The existing stockpile is undergoing life extension modifications. W87 modifications will extend service life by 30 years. Now, the U.S. is planning to spend $2 billion over 10 years for another major upgrade of the W87 warheads. Other existing warhead types will also be refurbished. All existing warheads in the arsenal are expected to be replaced eventually by more rugged and reliable designs. That design work has already begun at three nuclear arms laboratories. Congress lifted the ban on researching low-yield warheads (below 5-KT yield), opening the door to a whole new class of nuclear arms development. This research is in addition to development of the new Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), better known as the "bunker busters". Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory restarted small scale production of warhead cores in 2003. Plans are underway to greatly expand production capacity by 2018.
This section addresses U.S. rearmament activity for next-generation weapons and the infrastructure for producing/maintaining those weapons
Weapon Delivery Systems. Replacements for many, if not all, existing nuclear weapons are already in the works. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) suggested a new heavy bomber would be needed in 2040. Adding 30 years service life to a new bomber joining the arsenal in 2040 means it would not reach retirement until 2070. If new bomber production spanned 10-15 years, the youngest bombers would not retire until 2080-85 !! A new strategic nuclear submarine is scheduled to be operational by 2029 and be equipped with a next-generation SLBM. Minuteman III ICBM replacement is to begin by 2018 and the next-generation ICBM will likely have flexible capabilities and basing options compared to its predecessors.
Ballistic missiles and long-range bomber aircraft have been the mainstay of weapon delivery systems for decades. However, these systems have certain limitations which the U. S. hopes to overcome with "hypersonic" technology. The U.S. Air Force and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) are engaged in a joint program to develop and apply hypersonic technology for rapid weapon delivery anywhere on the globe. This new program is called Force Application and Launch from CONUS (FALCON). Perhaps one mission envisioned for hypersonic bombers would be for nuclear "bunker buster" attacks. The comprehensive FALCON research program spans a broad array of technology and system approaches. First flight tests to validate performance are scheduled to begin in 2007. High-speed aerodynamic control and heat dissipation are among key issues to be resolved and demonstrated in the flight tests.
New Warhead Research and Development. U.S. intent to continue reliance on nuclear arsenals for the indefinite future is proven by determined R & D efforts to develop new warhead types. Two new nuclear missions described in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) were: (1) attacking underground command centers or bio/chemical weapons stores with "bunker busters" and (2) reducing collateral damage with low-yield warheads (for more credible deterrence and operational use). Design work is already underway for a new class of robust nuclear warheads having much longer lifetimes, superior maintainability and greater reliability. Called the "Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRW) Program" , these new models could eventually replace all warheads. The U.S. is conducting basic nuclear research with the intent of developing next-generation nuclear warheads. Research of new, exotic approaches is proceeding on several tracks, for example, "microfusion" weapons and "isomer" bombs. Advanced warhead design teams have been reestablished at three national laboratories to incorporate new technical innovations for "bunker-busting" missions and for more accurate, variable-yield weapons.
Production Infrastructure. A third component of next-generation nuclear rearmament is new infrastructure for producing refurbished or new-type nuclear warheads. The centerpiece of that new capability will be the "Modern Pit Facility (MPF). MPF production capacity will dwarf current production rates when it becomes operational in 2018. If substantial nuclear disarmament were envisioned to be in progress by mid-century, this huge investment in expanded nuclear weapons infrastructure would hardly seem justified.
Russia, like the United States, continues to both maintain and modernize its nuclear arsenal. However, unlike the Cold War diplomacy which spawned a series of arms control treaties, the renewed arms competition may not be so restrained. Russia continues to deploy new-type, silo-based ICBMs, designated the TOPOL-M (or SS-27). Forty of these have been deployed since 1997 and at least seven more will be added. As early as 2006, road-mobile TOPOL-Ms are expected to join the arsenal, each carrying up to 6 warheads. Some 10-warhead SS-18s (which had been scheduled for retirement under now-defunct START II), will be retained in life-extended service until perhaps 2016-2020.
Russia announced in mid-2003 that it will build three new Borey-class submarines by 2010 for launching a new SLBM derived from the TOPOL-M ICBM (called the Bulava). While construction of the new subs is underway, Russia maintains a 14-boat fleet which is overhauled and refitted periodically. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) are also being added to the arsenal. Production of forty new SLBMs was ordered in 2001. The new Baluva SLBM under development is touted as capable of penetrating missile defenses. Russia continues to maintain and modernize its long range bomber force. A prop-driven, long-range cruise missile has been under development for over 10 years and may be nearing operational deployment. Nuclear warhead R&D also continues in Russia.
On October 2, 2003, the Russian Ministry of Defense issued its version of a "nuclear posture review", adapting nuclear doctrines for the next 30 years. This document promised a modernized strategic arsenal, including rejuvenated land-based weapons. Russia's rearmament plan for next-generation nuclear weapons is already being implemented. These new-type weapons represent major improvements over earlier models.
Russia now claims to be developing an entirely new and unique nuclear weapon. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov remarked in mid-February that it is "not possessed by any country in the world", but refused to say what made it unique. Some military analysts speculate this new system is simply a resurrection of old plans to develop maneuverable warheads. However, perusing all the evidence that can be gleaned from official Russian statements over the past 14 months, it appears the "unique" new nuclear weapon might be a hypersonic cruise vehicle (HCV) similar to the U. S. Falcon craft discussed in Section 3.1.6. Russia might be on a development trajectory to field nuclear hypersonic bombers within the next five years. Perhaps the U.S. lags Russia by some 5-10 years in engineering a combat-ready hypersonic bomber.
China is vigorously pursuing a rearmament program to maintain, improve and expand its nuclear arsenal. The transformation has been profound: silo-based, liquid-fueled missiles are being replaced by mobile-based, solid-fueled missiles which carry lighter, more accurate warheads. China is seeking a more survivable nuclear deterrent force which argues for increased reliance on submarines launch platforms. Development of a new "Type 094" offensive nuclear submarine is underway which can carry 16 SLBMs with estimated 8,000 kilometers range. A new Julang II (JU-2) SLBM is being developed for the Type O94 nuclear submarine. Some speculate the new Julang II SLBM could carry multiple warheads. (59) If deployed, multiple warheads could quickly magnify China's nuclear muscle. With just 5 warheads per missile, the year 2015 projection for up to 100 long-range missiles corresponds to 500 deployed warheads -- a giant leap from the mere 20 warheads now deployed on single-warhead ICBMs.
All nuclear weapon states (NWS), openly declared or not, are maintaining and/or upgrading arsenals for the indefinite future. All NWS except new members of the "nuclear club" also have a history of nuclear rearmament . Other than U.S., Russia and China, there are six NWS: France; UK; Israel; India; Pakistan; and North Korea. Program details of each are described.
1. All NWS are currently engaged in nuclear rearmament, i.e.: arsenal modernization through deployment of new or improved weapon systems.
2. The U.S. and Russia are updating selected weapon systems with life-extension modifications to extend nuclear force capabilities through mid-century.
3. The U.S., Russia and China are developing next-generation weapons which could continue in service well beyond mid-century. A next-generation U.S. strategic bomber might not retire until 2080-85. The U.S. is also modernizing its nuclear weapons infrastructure to support nuclear arsenals indefinitely.
4. U.S. national security policies are a consistent framework to justify nuclear rearmament indefinitely.
5. NWS behavior belies commitment to nuclear disarmament, as obligated under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Article VI.
Rearm: "1. to arm again. 2. to furnish with new or better weapons…" (1)
Note: See Section 5.0 for numbered references (as shown in parentheses above).
The nuclear weapon powers, led by the United States, Russia, and China, have been quietly making profound changes to their nuclear policies and arsenals. Evidence mounts to suspect nuclear disarmament will continue to be a distant goal well into this century. Current program activities and future plans reveal priority attention to long-term maintenance and improvement of nuclear arsenals. (2) Meanwhile, prospects for deep cuts appear ever more dim as arms control negotiations grind to a halt. There is little evidence to hope nuclear weapons abolition will be achieved anytime this century. (3) Most nuclear powers, in fact, are pursuing rearmament, not disarmament.
This situation stands in stark contrast to Article VI obligations under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Those obligations require good faith progress towards nuclear abolition. The disconnect between treaty obligations and actual performance has already compromised NPT regime capabilities needed to limit the global spread of nuclear arms. Now, the NPT regime faces an uncertain future as the 2005 NPT Review Conference approaches. Preparatory conferences for this upcoming review would indicate dismal prospects for a strengthened NPT, let alone assured treaty survival.
What is going on?
In a story reported by the Los Angeles Times on December 6, 2004, Russia continues to stress the importance of its nuclear arsenal. A stated motivation is to offset weaknesses in conventional military forces needed to deter strategic threats. (4) While this story is likely accurate, it overlooks the role of new U.S.-Russia nuclear rivalry. For example, Moscow boasts of new offensive capabilities to overcome the ballistic missile defenses pursued by Washington. (5) The action-reaction dynamics that fueled the "Cold War" arms race continue to this day and they spur China and others to keep pace.
Origins of the new nuclear competition are not difficult to pinpoint. A former Los Alamos Laboratory employee, Dr. Stephen M. Younger, articulated rationale for a whole new class of nuclear weapons in a June, 2000 document. (6) The Pentagon formally embraced this new doctrine in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) publicly disclosed in March, 2002. (6) But the NPR went much further. The U.S. would now modernize the nuclear weapons infrastructure and make extensive improvements to old-model nuclear weapons. (7) Requirements for next-generation bombers, missiles and nuclear submarines were stipulated (8) while existing weapons were undergoing life-extension upgrades. These NPR plans were further certified by White House national security strategy documents released in September and December, 2002. (9, 10) Requirements for new types of nuclear weapons were also underscored in the Pentagon's Defense Science Board study "Future Strategic Strike Forces" completed in Summer, 2003. (11) The FY 2006 budget requested by the Administration includes funds for such research. (12)
For Russia's part, a prime stimulus for nuclear rearmament was U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Russia announced June 14, 2002 that it was no longer bound to START II terms because of the ABM Treaty withdrawal. (13) This freed Russia to pursue various nuclear arsenal upgrades that would have been prohibited under the START II agreement. (13)
The action-reaction dynamics were then in place to drive a new nuclear arms race. A "snapshot" overview of race status in April, 2005 is provided by two charts:
"Nuclear Rearmament, Not Disarmament" available at http://www.abolishnukes.com/charts/nuclear_rearmament.html or click here
"Nuclear Arsenals Have Long Future" available at http://www.abolishnukes.com/charts/2005_npt_review_p4.html or click here
The first chart summarizes current nuclear rearmament activities in the United States, Russia and China and the second chart summarizes next-generation weapon plans for those three nuclear powers.
Nuclear rearmament programs of all nuclear weapon states (NWS) are each described under Section 3.0. However, before examining these lengthy details it might be well to consider two questions of context:
(a) What are legal obligations of NWS to give nuclear disarmament priority over nuclear rearmament?
(b) How is nuclear rearmament driven by official national security policies?
Both questions relate to whether nuclear rearmament is justified. Exploration of these questions might not yield "easy answers" but some measure of greater understanding might be gained -- at least to support the assessment of Section 3.0 details. The next two subsections look at these questions.
Two pivotal questions are (1) whether declared nuclear weapon powers are legally obligated to achieve disarmament and (2) whether nuclear weapon powers are satisfying the spirit and letter of such obligations. Neither question can be answered by a simple "yes" or "no".
An answer to the first question depends on whether a declared nuclear power is party or not to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Article VI of the NPT states that parties to the Treaty shall "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race…and to nuclear disarmament". (14) Consequently, the answer is "yes" for the U.S., Russia, China, France and the U.K. The answer is "no" for India, Pakistan and North Korea because they are not currently parties to the NPT. Israel is an ambiguous case since it has not officially declared nuclear weapons status but coyly avoids denying a nuclear deterrent capability.
The second question entails much more complexity and controversy. First, the "spirit" and "letter" components of the question should be considered separately because the answers are a "judgment call" based on different criteria. Legal issues underlying the "letter" aspect are a technical matter probably best handled by scholars in international law. However, the "spirit" aspect can be effectively judged by nearly anyone who is well-versed on the nuclear program and disarmament initiatives pursued by the five NPT nuclear powers.
Now, the discussion can be narrowed to whether the U.S., Russia, China, France and U.K. are honoring the spirit of their NPT commitments to pursue nuclear disarmament in good faith. This is a divisive debate that is decades old. The U.S. asserted at an NPT meeting on April 29, 2004 that:
"The United States is in full compliance with all its NPT obligations, including Article VI. Large numbers of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems have been, and continue to be, eliminated. A gradual, step-by-step process toward nuclear disarmament is the proper and most effective course to pursue. The United States is on that course, and is making real achievements towards that end". (15)
This characterization of disarmament progress is challenged by some informed observers, such as a critical assessment made by the Western States Legal Foundation:
"The approach taken by the United States towards its own disarmament obligations looks only backward, towards those immense Cold War stockpiles. It expects us to accept the possession and constant modernization of thousands of nuclear weapons for many decades to come as meaningful progress towards disarmament. But this backward looking approach fails to address the nuclear dangers we are facing in the 21st century". (15)
Perhaps a more balanced assessment is made in a special series of articles in the January/February, 2005 issue of Arms Control Today. (14)
The debate on nuclear power obligations is certain to continue at the 2005 NPT Review Conference (May 2-27, New York City). NPT representatives from around the world will weigh-in on the arguments. A "preview" of the brewing confrontation was demonstrated by a contentious debate during a recent panel discussion event in Washington, D.C. (16)
A prime objective for this document is to provide authoritative evidence as a basis for making informed judgments.
The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and other policy documents were identified earlier as origins for nuclear rearmament programs. Aside from the direct effect on nuclear arms programs, national security policies can also impact capabilities to curb nuclear weapons proliferation. To cite one example, global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium continue to grow for lack of an international ban on the production of fissile material. (17) The proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), in turn, is stalled by U.S. insistence that FMCT would be unverifiable. (14) The U.S. also opposes a IAEA proposal for a 5-year moratorium on the development of new fissile material production facilities. (82) Growing fissile material stockpiles are counterproductive to nuclear nonproliferation (because of vulnerability to theft) and therefore the U.S. policy position on FMCT compromises efforts to halt nuclear proliferation.
Synergy between different national security policies is another catalyst to nuclear rearmament. For example, the NPR call for new "bunker busters" and low-yield warheads is reinforced by the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) call for unilateral, pre-emptive strike options to counter proliferation threats. (9) Development of these "bunker busters" and low-yield warheads can be rationalized as supporting NSS counterproliferation policy (18) In another example, the NPR call for storing nuclear warheads as a hedge against future uncertainty is consistent with U.S. policy to not destroy warheads removed from active status by the U.S.-Russian "Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty" (SORT) …otherwise known as the "Moscow Treaty" (19, 20) Finally, a third example of policy synergism is between the NPR call for accelerating nuclear warhead testing preparations and U.S. policy to not support ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). (14) These three examples illustrate a consistent policy frame work to justify urgent and comprehensive rearmament initiatives.
The powerful coupling between official security policies and nuclear rearmament programs should not be underestimated.
This section describes (1) improvements being made to nuclear weapons systems already deployed in the arsenals of declared nuclear weapon states and (2) next-generation weapon system plans and developments. To the extent that information is available in the open literature, the breakout is by weapon type: land-based missiles; nuclear submarines; submarine missiles; strategic bombers and nuclear warheads.
Although portions of the U.S. nuclear arsenal are being retired (due to age and/or technical obsolescence) many deployed systems are being replaced by improved models or are undergoing modernization upgrades. (21) This activity is summarized in the following subsections.
Land-based missiles in the strategic arsenal are called Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). Two ICBM types are currently on operational alert: MX and Minuteman III. Each is capable of carrying multiple warheads. MX is scheduled for "retirement" by October, 2005. (21) MX silos are being retained rather than destroyed, as would have been required under the now defunct START II agreement. MX missiles will be retained in a reserve force for potential redeployment or other missions. These missile systems are part of the NPR "hedge" reserve, along with their downloaded nuclear warheads. (21)
The currently active Minuteman III ICBM force numbers 500, scheduled to carry up to 800 warheads. (22) (Many more warheads could be uploaded from the hedge reserve). Minuteman III missiles are being fitted with more powerful W78 warheads and more accurate MK-12 A reentry vehicles. This modernization is being accomplished under a 6-part, $6 billion program to improve Minuteman III accuracy and reliability, plus extend the ICBM service life beyond 2020. (21)
The service life of Trident nuclear submarines has been extended from 30 to 44 years, with the oldest sub scheduled for retirement in 2029. (21) Younger subs would be retired much later. Four of the Pacific-based Tridents are being upgraded to replace Trident I C4 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with more accurate Trident II D5 model SLBMs. (21)
Five more Trident D5s were purchased in FY 2005 and D5 production through 2013 will raise purchase orders from 390 to 540. Existing missiles will be replaced by a new variant, the D5LE, to extend SLBM service life through 2042. An intermediate range SLBM is also in early planning. (21)
The U.S. Navy is also making improvements to MK-4/W76 SLBM reentry vehicles that guide and fuse the nuclear warhead. Approximately 40% of these reentry vehicles will be modernized by 2012, providing enhanced lethality and targeting flexibility. (21) Another improvement program, underway since 2004, is called "Enhanced Effectiveness (E2) Reentry Body". Guided by Global Positioning Satellites, the E2 can hit targets within about 10 meters accuracy. (21)
Two long-range bombers for delivering nuclear weapons are currently in the U.S. arsenal: B-52H and B-2A. A 5-year upgrade of B-2s to carry a diverse mix of weapons was completed in 2003. The next scheduled B-2 upgrade will facilitate mission and targeting adjustments while enroute to target areas. (21)
The venerable B-52 has been periodically updated over its 50-plus year history. Two types of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles can be launched from B-52s and both types are currently undergoing modifications to extend service life through 2030. (21) A derivative of the F/A-22 Raptor is being considered as a possible bomber replacement option for the near term.
Aside from new warhead types being researched, the existing stockpile is undergoing life extension modifications. This program began in 1994 with the W87 warheads whose upgrades were completed last year. Those W87 modifications will extend service life by 30 years. Now, the U.S. is planning to spend $2 billion over 10 years for another major upgrade of the W87 warheads. (83) Other existing warhead types will also be refurbished, with first upgrades scheduled for completion beginning next year. (21) It should be noted that all existing warheads in the arsenal are expected to be replaced eventually by more rugged and reliable designs. That design work has already begun at three nuclear arms laboratories. (23)
In November, 2003, Congress lifted the ban on researching low-yield warheads (below 5-KT yield), opening the door to a whole new class of nuclear arms development. This research is in addition to development of the new Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), better known as the "bunker buster". RNEP and low-yield warhead development are consistent with the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and other national security policies. U.S. officials testified to Congress earlier this month on the need for these weapons to be deployed under a 20-year program. (84)
Research into next-generation nuclear warhead technology is also ongoing (24), as discussed in Section 3.6.1.
Another subject related to nuclear warheads is the infrastructure for producing new or upgraded warheads. After a 14-year suspension, Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory restarted small scale production of warhead cores in 2003. (25) The plutonium pit production process has been modernized to higher standards and the production rate could reach 10 pits per year by 2007. Plans to greatly expand production capacity by 2018 are discussed in the next section.
Preceding sections have focused on rearmament activities for nuclear weapon systems already deployed in the U.S. arsenal. This section addresses rearmament activity for next-generation weapons and the infrastructure for producing/maintaining those weapons. Three general topics are covered: weapon delivery systems (bombers, missiles, etc.); nuclear warhead research and development (new warhead types); and production infrastructure (new infrastructure for maintaining and improving nuclear warheads). The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) called for arsenal rearmament which assures nuclear strike force capabilities well into the second half of this century. (7) The premise is that nuclear weapons will be needed for at least the next 50 years. (8)
Replacements for many, if not all, existing nuclear weapons are already in the works. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) suggested a new heavy bomber would be needed in 2040, although the Air Force is considering an earlier replacement for the aging fleet. (21) Adding 30 years service life to a new bomber joining the arsenal in 2040 means it would not reach retirement until 2070. If new bomber production spanned 10-15 years, the youngest bombers would not retire until 2080-85!!
Both interim and long term bomber alternatives are being considered, including purchase of additional B-2s or variants. (26) Congressman Duncan Hunter (R-CA) remarked last year that such a purchase is among the "most pressing needs" of the U.S. military. (26) A next-generation cruise missile for the bomber fleet is also under study. (21)
A new strategic nuclear submarine is scheduled to be operational by 2029, when the oldest boat in the current fleet will likely be retired. (21) The new model sub will then be equipped with a next-generation SLBM , in line with NPR-defined goals. (8) An intermediate-range SLBM (SLIRBM) is also in early planning. (21)
Minuteman III ICBM replacement is to begin by 2018 and the next-generation ICBM will likely have flexible capabilities and basing options compared to its predecessor. Accuracy, range and payload attributes could vary across the force and all or part could be deployed on mobile platforms. (27) Acquisition of this new-type ICBM may be already underway. (27)
Ballistic missiles and long-range bomber aircraft have been the mainstay of weapon delivery systems for decades. However, these systems have certain limitations which the U. S. hopes to overcome with "hypersonic" technology. The U.S. Air Force and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) are engaged in a joint program to develop and apply hypersonic technology for rapid weapon delivery anywhere on the globe. (28) This new program is called Force Application and Launch from CONUS (FALCON) and it foresees unique advantages over ballistic missiles and conventional bombers (for example, in delivering "ground-penetrating munitions"). (29) Perhaps one mission envisioned for hypersonic bombers would be for nuclear "bunker buster" attacks.
The hypersonic flight concept represents an entirely different way to deliver weapon payloads over long distances. One way to visualize a typical mission of a hypersonic cruise vehicle (HCV) is : "like a stone skipping on the surface of a pond, the HCV would skip across the Earth's upper atmosphere until it reached the target area". (30) In a three-step sequence, the autonomous HCV would (a) power itself to, say, 40 km altitude; (b) continue climbing unpowered (ballistically) to higher altitude; (c) descend (still unpowered) in a glide until reaching much denser air. Then, the 3-step sequence is repeated over and over (like the skipping stone) until the HCV is in position to attack one or more targets.
The comprehensive FALCON research program spans a broad array of technology and system approaches, involving parallel research efforts. Nine different firms were awarded 6-month study contracts last year. (31) The overall three-phase program seeks a reusable HCV capability around 2025 and interim capabilities by about 2010. (29) Interim systems for validating hypersonic technology are a Small Launch Vehicle (SLV) and an expendable Common Aero Vehicle (CAV). SLVs would bring the 1,000 lb. payload CAV within striking distance of a target. Unlike ICBMs, CAVs can be recalled enroute to target. (32) First flight tests to validate performance are scheduled to begin in 2007. (33)
The reusable HCV, slated for 2025, would be capable of delivering a 12,000 lb. payload to a target area 9,000 miles from CONUS. (34) This payload might consist of several CAVs, cruise missiles, small diameter bombs or other munitions. (34) However, the hypersonic technology to accomplish this mission remains unproven. High-speed aerodynamic control and heat dissipation are among key issues to be resolved and demonstrated in the SLV/CAV flight tests. (34)
U.S. intent to continue reliance on nuclear arsenals for the indefinite future is proven by determined R & D efforts to develop new warhead types. Such R & D activity is propelled by one or more of the following engines:
(a) new mission requirements
(b) new maintenance/reliability requirements
(c) advances in science and technology (potential or actual)
New mission requirements. New military mission requirements come and go as security threats and defensive/offensive strategies continue to evolve. These new requirements can be either real or imagined (contrived). Two new nuclear missions described in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) were: (1) attacking underground command centers or bio/chemical weapons stores with "bunker busters" and (2) reducing collateral damage with low-yield warheads (for more credible deterrence and operational use). (8) Funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) "bunker buster" is included in the FY 2006 White House budget. (12) The $8.5 million is to be split between Department of Energy (DOE) and Department of Defense (DOD) programs. (35) RNEP critics point to collateral damage and major release of radioactive debris. Linton Brooks, a high DOE official, acknowledges the problem: "…(it) is going to be hugely destructive over a large area. No sane person would use a weapon like that lightly". (36)
Congress overturned the 1993 Spratt-Furse ban on low-yield warheads (under 5-KT yield) in the FY 2004 defense bill and several research initiatives are now being pursued. (24) Critics of these new warhead developments are concerned they will undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime. (18) The White House disagrees, asserting U.S. nuclear weapons research has no practical affect on nuclear proliferators. (37)
New maintenance/reliability requirements. Design work is already underway for a new class of robust nuclear warheads having much longer lifetimes, superior maintainability and greater reliability. (23) Called the "Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRW) Program" (started in 2004), these new models could eventually replace all warheads now in the arsenal, perhaps beginning in 2012. (85) The average age of current warheads is already five years beyond expected lifetime (15 years). (23) Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman claims there is no intention "to produce new atomic armaments"…"it’s a matter of maintaining what we have…". (38) However, the replacement of old warheads with new or refurbished warheads fits, literally, the definition of rearmament. Also, this warhead replacement involves building or modifying warheads to meet new design requirements. Congresswoman Ellen Tauscher (D-CA) alleges the RRW program could be used as cover for developing "smaller and more useable" nuclear warheads. (39)
Advances in science and technology (potential or actual) Nuclear weapons development since the mid-1940s has been radically transformed by advances in science and technology. Warhead yield-to-weight ratios have jumped astronomically and modern designs bear little resemblance to the primitive atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Technological innovations can motivate development of new warhead types much the same way as evolving mission/system requirements. Stated differently, if weapon technologies were frozen then there would be less impetus or means to develop new weapon types.
The U.S. is conducting basic nuclear research with the intent of developing next-generation nuclear warheads. (24) Research of new, exotic approaches is proceeding on several tracks, for example, "microfusion" weapons and "isomer" bombs. (24) Microfusion weapons would be fueled by tritium rather than enriched uranium or plutonium. An isomer bomb might be based on the Hafnium 178 isotope and potentially could have an explosive power 50,000 times greater than TNT. (24)
Despite the skepticism of authoritative critics, these efforts are supported by substantial program budgets. No one can reasonably predict whether these new approaches will succeed but it remains a clear priority of the nuclear weapons laboratories. Advanced warhead design teams have been reestablished at three national laboratories to incorporate new technical innovations for "bunker-busting" missions and for more accurate, variable-yield weapons. (8) This commitment to new nuclear weapons research and development is further evidence the U.S. intends to maintain and improve its nuclear arsenal indefinitely. Nuclear weapons abolition is still well beyond the foreseeable future.
A third component of next-generation nuclear rearmament is new infrastructure for producing refurbished or new-type nuclear warheads. The centerpiece of that new capability will be the "Modern Pit Facility (MPF). MPF production capacity will dwarf current production rates when it becomes operational in 2018. (21) Requirements for a revitalized nuclear weapons infrastructure capable of "surge" production were codified in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). (8) Serious questions have been raised on the need for such an expansive MPF (40) but U.S. officials contend it is a necessary hedge before significant cuts can be made in the nuclear arsenal. (41) Some analysts hint the new "responsive infrastructure" program has a hidden agenda: replacing old, retired warheads with new, improved warheads. (20) If so, that would be nuclear rearmament on a massive scale. If substantial nuclear disarmament were envisioned to be in progress by mid-century, this huge investment in expanded nuclear weapons infrastructure would hardly seem justified. Apparently such a disarmament vision is not yet taken seriously.
Russia, like the United States, continues to both maintain and modernize its nuclear arsenal. In many respects, the Cold War nuclear arms race lingers, propelled by similar action-reaction dynamics. (5) However, unlike the Cold War diplomacy which spawned a series of arms control treaties, the renewed arms competition may not be so restrained. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002, may be the last of its kind. Condoleezza Rice, now U.S. Secretary of State, remarked in a PBS interview at the time: "We believe that (SORT) is a transitional measure to a day when arms control will play a very minor role in U.S.-Russian relations, if a role at all". (5)
Russia continues to deploy new-type, silo-based ICBMs, designated the TOPOL-M (or SS-27). Forty of these have been deployed since 1997 (5) and at least seven more will be added. (42) As early as 2006, road-mobile TOPOL-Ms are expected to join the arsenal, each carrying up to 6 warheads. (5, 43)
Some earlier-model ICBMs are also being retained but all old, liquid-fueled missiles are expected to be retired by 2009. (44) Some 10-warhead SS-18s (which had been scheduled for retirement under now-defunct START II), will be retained in life-extended service until perhaps 2016-2020. (44) Russia had also announced the 6-warhead SS-19 ICBM force (also to have been eliminated by START II) will actually be increased in 2010 and beyond. (43) The rail-based, 10-warhead SS-24 is another model currently in the arsenal that was to have been eliminated by START II. The single-warhead SS-25 (allowable under START II) is road-mobile and is deployed at nine locations, but is being replaced by TOPOL-M ICBMs. (44)
Development of Russia's next-generation ICBMs is discussed in Section 3.2.6
Russia announced in mid-2003 that it will build three new Borey-class submarines by 2010 for launching a new SLBM derived from the TOPOL-M ICBM (called the Bulava). (45) Six months later, General Yuri Baluyervsky (a senior officer on Russia's General Staff) affirmed that Moscow continues to place high priority on developing its submarine forces. (46) Those plans are still being implemented but first deployment of the new subs may wait until the Bulava SLMB is ready for operations. (44)
While construction of the new subs is underway, Russia maintains a 14-boat fleet which is overhauled and refitted periodically. At least three major overhauls were completed in 2003. (43)
General Baluyervsky's comment cited above is underscored by current programs committed to revitalizing SLBM capabilities. Production of forty new SLBMs was ordered in 2001 - the first such order in a decade. (47) Design work on the new Baluva SLBM started by 2002 and open-sea submarine patrols resumed in 2003. (43) Modifications to the SS-N-23 SLBM include service life extension; variant to increase warhead capability from 4 to 10; and new hard-target kill capability. (48)
The new Baluva SLBM nearing operational deployment is touted as capable of penetrating missile defenses (5) and carrying up to 12 multiple warheads (43) over a range of 8,300 kilometers. (49) Mated to the new Borey-class submarine, it can be launched from 55 meters depth while the sub is underway at 6 knots. (45) Flight tests of the Bulava are slated to begin by the third quarter of this year. (50)
Russia continues to maintain and modernize its long range bomber force. The Russian newspaper Vremya Novostey recently reported plans to add two new Tu-160 bombers with cruise missiles. (51) Upgrades of the existing Tu-160 fleet were announced in March, 2002: avionics and weapon system improvements along with service life extension modifications. (43) The Russian strategic bomber forces are a mix of the Tu-160 Blackjacks and the aging Tu-95 Bears. This force can deliver bombs, short-range attack missiles and air-launched cruise missiles. A prop-driven, long-range cruise missile has been under development for over 10 years and may be nearing operational deployment. (43)
Nuclear weapons work in Russia is under closely-guarded secrecy but limited public information reveals active research and development of new nuclear warheads. (47) Russian nuclear scientists confirm significant funds have been budgeted for nuclear weapons research and Russian officials once boasted that funding jumped 60% in 2002 for Sarov-centered nuclear weapons development activity. (47) Among new developments, a new warhead for the SS-27 ICBM was successfully tested in 2004 (46) and President Putin revealed February 18, 2004 that an advanced technology, highly maneuverable warhead was being developed. (46) One military official asserted the new warhead technology to penetrate missile defenses could be deployed by 2010. (52)
On October 2, 2003, the Russian Ministry of Defense issued its version of a "nuclear posture review", adapting nuclear doctrines for the next 30 years. (53) This document promised a modernized strategic arsenal, including rejuvenated land-based weapons. President Putin told a meeting of NATO defense ministers a few days later that older ICBMs would be replaced by SS-19s to give Russia "enough time in order to develop new (twenty-first-century) weapons". (53) Russia's rearmament plan for next-generation nuclear weapons is already being implemented. Several near-term deployments of new systems were mentioned in preceding sections: road-mobile TOPOL-M ICBMs; Borey-class nuclear subs; Bulava SLBMs; and a new long-range cruise missile. These new-type weapons represent major improvements over earlier models. For example, the solid-fueled Bulava SLBM is designed to penetrate ballistic missile defenses. Countermeasures and decoys could foil mid-course defenses and maneuvering warheads could skirt terminal-phase defenses. (54) Other advanced features of the Bulava include faster-burning engines (to slip through boost-phase defenses); laser attack protection; and shielding from radiation and electromagnetic pulse environments. (54) The Bulava could probably carry up to 10 warheads per missile and deliver each warhead to a different target (so-called Multiple, Independent Reentry Vehicle, or MIRV).
Much less is known about next-generation nuclear weapons scheduled for later operational deployment. A new 10-warhead ICBM with a throw weight of 4.4 tons has probably started development. (44) Like the Bulava, it is expected to feature advanced penetration capabilities against missile defense systems. (55)
Russia now claims to be developing an entirely new and unique nuclear weapon. Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov remarked in mid-February that it is "not possessed by any country in the world", but refused to say what made it unique. (56) However, some clues are available from various statements made since President Putin first revealed this "mysterious" development on February 18, 2004. (46) He said the weapon will be "capable of hitting targets continents away at hypersonic speed, with high precision and the ability of broad maneuver both in terms of altitude and direction of their flight". The next day, Col. Gen. Yuri N. Baluyevsky provided additional details, saying it was a "hypersonic flying vehicle" (57) which could skirt regional missile defenses and bypass intercept areas. (52) Another version of the general's statement reported he used the term "hypersonic glide vehicle". (5)
Some military analysts speculate this new system is simply a resurrection of old plans to develop maneuverable warheads, but note that such warheads would have much reduced accuracy. (46) There are at least three difficulties with this speculation: (1) Russia claims the new weapon will hit targets "with high precision", (2) maneuvering warheads are not likely to make broad maneuvers of the kind described for the new, "unique" weapon, and (3) maneuvering warheads are not a unique technology that only Russia possesses.
President Putin again made reference to the new nuclear weapon in televised remarks to his military commanders on November 17, 2004. He gave no new details other than to say it has been successfully tested and it is a system "other nuclear states do not have and will not have in the immediate years to come". (57)
Perusing all the evidence that can be gleaned from official Russian statements over the past 14 months, it appears the "unique" new nuclear weapon might be a hypersonic cruise vehicle (HCV) similar to the U. S. Falcon craft discussed in Section 3.1.6. The hypersonic flight concept is not a new idea, but Russia could have "leapfrogged" the U.S. in developing and testing an operational strategic system. HCVs have also been called "hypersonic bombers" or "sub-orbital bombers" in the jargon of new strategic weapons research. Russia might be on a development trajectory to field nuclear hypersonic bombers within the next five years (46) See Section 3.1.6 for U.S. program efforts.
Why might the U.S. lag Russia in developing a hypersonic military capability? Since both programs are cloaked in secrecy, an attempt to provide a specific answer to this hypothetical question would be highly speculative. However, one general cause for a "hypersonic gap" (if such a gap exists) might be differences in development strategy. For example, the U.S. Falcon program places high research priority on low cost-per-pound space launch systems which take-off from conventional runways. Russia could pursue a fast-track strategy in which future launch costs are not a high priority. ICBMs or other-type boosters could be used to launch "CAV" hypersonic bombers. Russia claims it is already in the testing phase of its "unique" weapon. It may have already surmounted some of the technology issues that the U.S. is yet to investigate. Perhaps the U.S. lags Russia by some 5-10 years in engineering a combat-ready hypersonic bomber. Russia's aerospace capabilities should not be underestimated. Again, these highly speculative remarks are not a reliable answer to hypothetical "hypersonic gap" questions.
The CIA reported in January, 2002 that China had about 20 silo-based ICBMs but estimated growth to some 75-100 long range missiles by 2015, many of which would be on mobile platforms (e.g.: submarines). (58) In other words, the CIA predicted a significant nuclear rearmament effort that would bolster China's arsenal, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Evidence to date supports that prediction: China is vigorously pursuing a rearmament program to maintain, improve and expand its nuclear arsenal.
China has been modernizing its long-range missile force for some two decades. The transformation has been profound: silo-based, liquid-fueled missiles are being replaced by mobile-based, solid-fueled missiles which carry lighter, more accurate warheads. (59, 60) Both land and sea mobility are being pursued and the CIA estimates most long-range missiles will be mobile by 2015. (59)
China's longest range missile, the DF-31, has an estimated range of 8,000 kilometers…probably able to reach Hawaii and Alaska but not the Continental United States (CONUS). However, its range is being extended to 12,000 kilometers in the DF-31A variant, which would put CONUS at risk. Deployment of the longer range DF-31A is expected between 2006 and 2010 (59) and two mobile versions are likely: land mobile and sea mobile. (61)
China is seeking a more survivable nuclear deterrent force (61) which argues for increased reliance on submarines as missile launch platforms. However, the operational arsenal currently has only one Xia-class nuclear powered submarine. The Xia was launched in April, 1981 and carries only 12 medium-range SLBMs. (59) Development of a new "Type 094" offensive nuclear submarine is underway which can carry 16 SLBMs with estimated 8,000 kilometers range. (59) The new boat was launched July, 2004 and could be fully operational by mid-2006. (62) This progress is much faster than had been anticipated (62), adding to the Pentagon's concerns for China's build-up of naval forces. (86)
The Xia submarine carries the 1,700-kilometer-range Julang I (JU-1) SLBM which was successfully test launched in 1988. (59) But the Xia's missile launch system may not be fully operational and has been considered "experimental" by the intelligence community. (59)
A new Julang II (JU-2) SLBM is being developed for the Type O94 nuclear submarine. The Julang II is a DF-31A ICBM variant (61) and perhaps could be equipped with multiple warheads. (59) Operational deployment had been expected by 2010 (61) but could come much earlier as the sub becomes available for service by mid-2006. (62)
China continues to upgrade its bomber force but perhaps with less priority compared to other components of the nuclear arsenal. Bomber capabilities still rely on medium-range aircraft whose operational radius can be extended by aerial refueling. Two models in the current arsenal are the Hong 6 and SU-30. About 100-120 Hong 6 (based on the Soviet TU-16 Badger) were manufactured by China in the 1980-1990 time period. About 80 SU-30s have been delivered from Russia as of late 2003 and a purchase agreement for SU-30 upgrades was reached in early 2003. (59) Technical improvements extending useful life to the bomber force include modifications for aerial refueling and for launching newly developed land-attack cruise missiles. (59) China has sought to replace its aging Hong 6 fleet but the SU-30 may be considered a near-term alternative.
China's program for upgrading its nuclear arsenal started some 20 years ago and included warhead improvement objectives such as reduced weight and improved accuracy. (59) China's grasp of multiple warhead technology also dates from that time and a flight test was conducted as recently as February, 2003. (59, 63) What is not clear is how much that technology is being pushed for operational deployment. Some speculate the new Julang II SLBM could carry multiple warheads. (59) If deployed, multiple warheads could quickly magnify China's nuclear muscle. With just 5 warheads per missile, the year 2015 projection for up to 100 long-range missiles corresponds to 500 deployed warheads. This would be a giant leap from the mere 20 warheads now deployed on single-warhead ICBMs.
It should be noted that China's arms control rhetoric consistently opposes new nuclear warhead designs and research. (60) Whether such rhetoric translates to an effective brake on China's nuclear ambitions remains to be seen.
China is already vigorously developing and fielding next-generation nuclear weapons, as described in the preceding paragraphs. Information on future plans is not readily available in the open literature. China's nuclear program lacks transparency (60) but one could hope for greater transparency if China becomes more engaged in multilateral arms control and if a mobile-based deterrent force is viewed as less vulnerable to pre-emptive attack.
All nuclear weapon states (NWS), openly declared or not, are maintaining arsenals for the indefinite future. All NWS except new members of the "nuclear club" also have a history of nuclear rearmament (the addition of new or improved nuclear weapon systems).
Other than U.S., Russia and China, there are six NWS: France; UK; Israel; India; Pakistan; and North Korea. (South Africa and Libya are assumed to have disbanded their previously declared nuclear programs). Nuclear weapon program activities in these six NWS are summarized below:
France has scaled-back or eliminated portions of its nuclear weapons program (64) Production of fissile material has ceased and nuclear weapon testing facilities have been shutdown. Land-based missiles and attack aircraft have also been removed from the nuclear arsenal. The number of nuclear-armed submarines has also been reduced from 5 to 4. However, there is no indication France intends to disarm in the foreseeable future and can be expected to maintain and improve its remaining arsenal. For example, France plans to deploy a new model SLBM (64), making it a current member of the "nuclear rearmament club".
The U.K. has a small nuclear arsenal similar to that of France (four nuclear-armed submarines) and likewise seems inclined to maintain a "minimum" deterrent force for the indefinite future. (65) Unlike France, U.K.'s nuclear weapon systems and policies mimic those of the United States -- the U.K. and U.S. even share a common pool of SLBMs. (66) The U.K. is now considering a new replacement for its Trident systems, so apparently is not planning to refrain from nuclear rearmament activity. (65)
Israel is estimated to have 100-200 nuclear warheads (67) available for deployment on strategic aircraft, land-based missiles, and submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). (68) Their nuclear weapon program dates from the mid-1950s and has a history of periodic rearmament activity. Current U.S. deliveries of new F-16 aircraft could extend to 2008 (68) and Israel confirmed in late 2003 that it had modified U.S.-supplied Harpoon SLCMs to carry nuclear warheads. (67) Like China and other nuclear powers, Israel maintains tight nuclear program secrecy, so the full extent of its current and planned nuclear rearmament is unknown to the outside world. The U.S. State Department has recently urged Israel to forswear nuclear weapons but maybe not in the 'foreseeable future". (87)
India is in the midst of producing and deploying operational nuclear forces in a triad of air, land and sea-based elements. (69, 70) For example, India announced August 16, 2002 it had started production of two new missile types: 1,500-mile range Agni ballistic missile and the 185-mile range Brahmos cruise missile (which can be launched from aircraft, ships and submarines). (71) Next-generation missile types are also under development, such as the 3,300-mile Surya ICBM and the 210-mile Sagarika SLBM. (69) The submarine launch platform for the Brahmos and Sagarika missiles might be the nuclear-powered "Advanced Technology Vessel" (ATV) under Indian development, or a nuclear sub leased from Russia. (70) The first ATV sub might be launched as early as 2007. India has also established new command centers to assure a survivable, second-strike, deterrent capability. (72)
Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto recently revealed that Pakistan had nuclear bomb components by 1988, but chose at that time not to assemble a complete weapon. (73) Pakistan, like India, has a small nuclear arsenal but is making strides towards a capable offensive force. Some ballistic missile tests appear "tit for tat" between Pakistan and India. One day in March, 2003 the adversaries each tested nuclear-capable, short-range missiles. (72) There are indications Pakistan might wish to match India's development of a modern nuclear triad of air, land and sea-based weapons. (74)
Scant data are available in open sources for estimating numbers and types of Pakistan's nuclear arms. The U.S.-supplied F-16 is a likely nuclear-capable aircraft in Pakistan's arsenal but the Mirage V (France) or A-5 (China) are other possibilities. (74) At least two land-based ballistic missile types are being developed and tested: short-range Haft-3 and medium-range Haft-4. A longer-range variant of the Haft series may also be under development. (72)
Since Pakistan openly conducted nuclear warhead tests in 1998 it has had two crisis-level confrontations with India (1999 and 2001-2). Perhaps escalation to a nuclear weapons exchange was prevented only through intense U.S. diplomacy. (75)
Pyongyang, with Soviet help, started its nuclear weapons program in the 1960s. (76) China and Pakistan have also helped the program move forward. North Korea probably joined the "nuclear club" in the early 1990s, with secret assembly of one or two warheads. (77) Now, North Korea openly acknowledges it has nuclear arms and seems bent on expanding warhead production. The currently operating five-megawatt nuclear reactor can produce sufficient plutonium for about one warhead per year. This production rate could jump to some 8-13 weapons per year by completing construction of both its 50- megawatt reactor and the uranium enrichment facilities being built. (78) Some experts estimate this production rate could be reached by the end of this decade. (78)
Paralleling nuclear warhead production, the D.P.R.K. is developing ballistic missiles that could possibly strike CONUS. Jane's Defense Weekly reported in August, 2004 that two new missile types have such potential. The first is a land-based missile (range up to 4,000 kilometers) and the second is sea-based (range at least 2,500 kilometers). (79) Long-range missile tests were suspended six years ago but North Korea indicated last month it might resume those tests. (80)
North Korea purchased 12 decommissioned Russian submarines in 1993 which could be modified for the new SLBMs. There is evidence former Russian missile specialists may now be assisting D.P.R.K. efforts. (79) However, some U.S. officials are skeptical that these developments will materialize as threats to CONUS security. (81)
North Korea is still a new nuclear weapons power and its future nuclear plans are essentially unknown to the outside world. The D.P.R.K. is a closed society with a reputation for successfully guarding secret activities. One concern is that North Korea would export nuclear materials or warheads to states or groups which, in turn, pose direct threats to U.S. security. The U.S. has been urging North Korea to roll-back its nuclear arms program but that has been consistently rejected. Pyongyang counters it might consider a freeze on weapons production. (88)
The foregoing discussion has addressed three principal aspects of nuclear weapon states (NWS) behavior:
(a) Program activity to maintain and improve current nuclear force capabilities,
(b) Program plans and current R & D for next-generation weapon systems, including support infrastructure for long-term nuclear force capabilities, and
(c) U.S. national security policies underlying (a) and (b) -- to exemplify official policy context used to justify nuclear rearmament programs.
Principal conclusions are the following:
1. All nuclear weapon states (NWS) are currently engaged in nuclear rearmament, i.e.: arsenal modernization through deployment of new or improved weapon systems.
2. The U.S. and Russia are updating selected weapon systems with life-extension modifications to extend nuclear force capabilities through mid-century.
3. The U.S., Russia and China are developing next-generation weapons which could continue in service well beyond mid-century. A next-generation U.S. strategic bomber might not retire until 2080-85. The U.S. is also modernizing its nuclear weapons infrastructure to support nuclear arsenals indefinitely.
4. U.S. national security policies are a consistent framework to justify nuclear rearmament indefinitely.
5. NWS behavior belies commitment to nuclear disarmament, as obligated under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Article VI.
Donald C. Whitmore
April 17, 2005
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