Missile Defense: Farce and Fraud
Donald C. Whitmore
October 1, 2002
Note: This document supports a chart of the same title located at:
http://www.abolishnukes.com/charts/missile_defense_farce_fraud.html
The chart provides an outline of document contents and this document can be accessed/scrolled by clicking on topics within
the chart.
Table of Contents
Introduction
Missile Defense is a Farce
Missile Defense is a Fraud
Sources
Syndicated columnist Molly Irvins once dubbed strategic missile defense "a case of U.S. military lunacy" {1} and a Washington Post story early last year called it "pie in the sky" {2}. Criticism continued to grow through the summer of 2001, with one columnist calling it "defense fantasy" and "recycled nonsense" {3}. Prominent lawmakers added to the public criticism. Senator Tom Daschle, in an August 9 speech, charged "national missile defense is the most expensive possible response to the least likely threat..." {4}. Senator Joe Biden, addressing the National Press Club on September 10, warned "the effort to make such a system work would cost astronomical amounts of money"..."and it would not offer the protection that its proponents promise" {5}. However, on September 11, great tragedy struck at the heart of America and the nation turned its attention to the fight against terrorism. Public discussion of missile defense has now slowed to nearly a complete halt.
The missile defense issues raised before September 11, 2001 are still relevant. Numerous questions remain on threat assessment; technical feasibility; cost affordability; system effectiveness; defense priorities; national security impacts, etc. Those questions are hardly being addressed in the public arena. Making matters worse, the missile defense program is now heading into shadows of increased classification of information, compounded by reduced oversight.
For sake of national security, renewed public discussion of missile defense issues is urgent. Strategic missile defense is both a farce and a fraud and, as such, it is damaging to U.S. security. Constructive public debate is needed and the results of that debate should lead to greater security for both America and the world.
Webster's Dictionary defines farce as "a ridiculous sham". That happens to be an accurate description of strategic missile defense (in contrast to localized, tactical missile defense for Navy ships and battlefield troops). The promised protection from weapons of mass destruction is a sham and continued pursuit of a nation-wide missile shield is ridiculous. First, there is little likelihood it could ever be made to work reliably and effectively. Even if it could be made to work, it could be easily defeated by simple tactics and countermeasures. For example, missile defenses could be overwhelmed by multiple warhead salvos and/or decoys {6). If any marginal protection were gained, it would certainly not be worth the enormous costs to develop, install and maintain the system. Foolish investment in missile defenses reduces resources urgently needed to combat terrorism and defend the homeland.
Even if a national missile shield were workable and affordable it would still be a bad idea. Deployment of those defenses would likely spur a new arms race and damage national security {7}. Not only is missile defense a ridiculous sham, it is a dangerous farce. The first one-third of this document provides evidence supporting this claim.
Missile Shield Easily Defeated
Visions of missiles bouncing off an impenetrable shield are the stuff of science fiction and fantasy. China and Russia are already confident they can foil U.S. missile defenses {8}; {9}; {10}. Former Undersecretary of Defense Jacques Gansler testified in June, 2000 Congressional hearings that "this is a game where the offense clearly has an advantage" {11}. A panel of scientists from MIT and the Union of Concerned Scientists concluded the same thing in a 175-page study report on practical countermeasures to missile defense {12}. One panelist asserted: "This is basic physics"..."it's as close to a proof as you can get that the system won't work".
Another easy way to defeat missile defense is through "defense suppression" tactics. This simply means critical system components (radar sensors, communications, command centers, etc.) are attacked to disable missile intercept functions. Senator Jon Kyle once explained a practical example in noting the physical vulnerability of a precision radar needed to discriminate decoys from real warheads {13}. China, for one, plans to cripple U.S. missile defense by physical attacks on key system facilities {8}. Such tactics are included in a comprehensive list of countermeasures available at http://www.abolishnukes.com/charts/countermeasures_to_defeat_nmd.html
To believe a missile defense system can operate with impunity in a combat environment is sheer fantasy. Offense is generally favored to win over defense.
Meaningless Protection From Weapons of Mass Destruction (WOMD)
Nearly all strategic missile defense efforts to date have concentrated on how to intercept long-range ballistic missiles. This program emphasis is clearly incoherent with most likely WOMD threats. The intelligence community concluded in a recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that WOMD attacks by missiles are less likely than by ships, trucks, aircraft, or other means {14}. Several "blue ribbon" panels have also concluded terrorist threats are a grave concern, for example, the bipartisan Hart/Rudman Commission {15}. More will be said on this emerging threat.
Even among missile attack possibilities, the threat from long range ballistic missiles is least likely. This is because the launch point for a ballistic missile can be calculated from its observed flight trajectory, enabling a retaliatory strike against the identified attacker. However, cruise-type missiles can fly zig-zag routes near the earth's surface and underneath ground radar coverage. More will also be said about this threat, but suffice to say ballistic missiles are much less dangerous than cruise missiles {16}.
Placing major defense emphasis on the least likely threat from weapons of mass destruction is sheer folly. America deserves better protection.
Missile Defense Is Impotent Against Terrorists
Even a trillion-dollar missile shield would not stop terrorists from bringing weapons of mass destruction (WOMD) across U.S. borders. Yet, WOMD terrorism is the most serious threat to U.S. security. The tragic consequences of a WOMD attack are nearly unthinkable. Nuclear weapons are particularly devastating and their effects on cities or other populated targets are difficult to imagine. Descriptions of nuclear weapon effects are available at
http://www.abolishnukes.com/short_essays/trident_sub_whitmore.html
and
http://www.abolishnukes.com/short_essays/philosophical_reflections.html
Yet, the farcical pursuit of missile defenses against unlikely threats continues to gain momentum and compete with funds needed for counterterrorism. The disconnect between public policy priorities and the greatest threats to national security should be obvious. For some reason it is not yet obvious. It is time to question where terrorism defense lies among national priorities, especially with respect to missile defense. The next few paragraphs look further at the WOMD terrorist threat.
WOMD Terrorist Threats To U.S. Security
The potential for genocidal attacks against Americans was demonstrated by foreign terrorists on Sept. 11, 2001. Had those terrorists used weapons of mass destruction the results could have been much more catastrophic, perhaps killing hundreds of thousands {17}. What if Osama bin Laden already has nukes? Evidence points to his quest for nuclear weapons and his intention to use them (see http://www.abolishnukes.com/charts/does_bin_laden_have_nukes.html) President Bush has acknowledged bin Laden seeks nuclear weapons and there is concern "loose nukes" in Russia's arsenal could fall into his hands {18}; {19}. Prime Minister Tony Blair has also warned of nuclear terrorism {20}. A bipartisan task force headed by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler concluded WOMD dangers are "the most urgent unmet national security threat" {21}.
Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Policy
Nuclear weapons proliferation has been a long term concern and that has spawned significant arms control measures, including the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Nuclear powers, including the United States, have frequently reaffirmed commitment to the NPT. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry once called arms control the best defense against WOMD proliferation {22}.
However, the current U.S. administration has distain for formal arms control and has chosen, in a recent policy shift, to emphasize "counterproliferation" over "nonproliferation". This jargon translates to choosing threat response capabilities (such as threat interception and WOMD disaster management) in preference over threat prevention measures (different ways, including arms control agreements, to make it difficult for rogue states and terrorists to obtain WOMD). Strategic missile defense is one cornerstone of this emphasis on "counterproliferation" {23}. Overall, this new strategic policy could be regarded as reckless abandonment of historically effective means for threat reduction and as imprudent disregard for downside risks to national security. An ounce of nonproliferation arms control is worth at least a ton of missile defense counterproliferation.
This cursory discussion barely outlines issues and stakes related to WOMD terrorist threats and missile defense. When genocidal attacks put millions at risk, the stakes must be gauged extremely high. Missile defense contributes nothing to reducing those risks and it steals resources needed to combat terrorism. Strategic missile defense is, indeed, a dangerous farce.
Missile Defense Is Impotent Against Cruise Missiles
If defense against ballistic missiles is technically challenging, then cruise missile defense is virtually impossible. Considered the more dangerous threat {16}, cruise missiles are a daunting challenge for surveillance detection and tracking. Countermeasures and tactics such as stealth technology and barrage attacks make matters worse {24}. Meanwhile, the cruise missile threat is growing through both numerical proliferation and technical sophistication {25}. Rogue states are expected to be seeking advanced cruise missiles, which could then be passed on to terrorist cells. Conceivably, cruise missiles could even be launched from within U.S. borders, say from a barge somewhere along the Mississippi River or from a secluded barn in the Appalachians or Rockies. Again, offense has the advantage over defense and is generally favored to win. William Perry was right to suggest arms control is the best defense against WOMD proliferation {22}.
Missile Defense Damages National Security
Missile defense proponents would have us believe a nation-wide shield benefits our security in important and indispensable ways. Evidence points to the exact opposite: strategic missile defense is a liability to national security.
Aside from astronomical costs cutting into other defense capabilities, the pursuit of a national shield actually provokes increased threats to U.S. security. Those threats grow in at least three ways: (1) increased reliance on multiple warhead missiles; (2) nuclear arsenal upgrades and expansions to maintain parity with U.S. and hedge against a future U.S. breakout; and (3) damage to the arms control regime that is essential for limiting nuclear arsenals and containing WOMD proliferation. This threat escalation should concern everyone, including Congress and the general public. It should be the duty of defense experts to explain the new dangers in understandable terms.
The next three sections examine how strategic missile defense endangers U.S. security. Then the discussion moves on to the subject of fraud.
Missile Defense Spurs New Threats From Multiple Warhead Missiles
Most arms control scholars and defense experts are aware of the connection between strategic missile defense and multiple-warhead offensive missiles. Many of these authorities also understand the dangerous instabilities which can evolve through the dynamics of that connection. A simplified explanation is given in the following paragraphs, followed by evidence a U.S. missile shield will increase the multiple warhead threat.
Modern offensive ballistic missiles which carry multiple warheads can dispense each warhead to a different target. These missiles are said to be MIRVed, where MIRV means Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles (warheads). Some strategic missiles in the U.S. arsenal can be MIRVed with over a dozen warheads each. Thus, the total number of warheads in a nuclear arsenal can be greatly multiplied by MIRVing each offensive missile.
Why would a nuclear power choose to MIRV its missiles? Perhaps the most ominous reason would be to gain what is called "1st strike posture". This means the attacker would strike first in an effort to destroy an enemie's capacity to retaliate. This first strike would hit with as many warheads as possible to kill the enemies offensive forces and thereby limit retaliatory damage to the homeland. MIRVing is the quickest and cheapest way to maximize total warheads in an arsenal. However, if two or more nuclear powers strive for 1st strike posture, the result becomes extremely unstable. No one wants to be the victim of a surprise first strike. Policies such as hair trigger alert and "launch on warning" become implemented. A false warning could then unleash an "accidental" nuclear war...an outcome clearly unacceptable to any rational person.
Another reason to MIRV an arsenal is in response to a missile defense system being deployed by a potential enemy. MIRVing has several advantages in this situation: (1) It is an easy way to defeat missile defenses by simply launching a large salvo of warheads which overcomes the defense system capacity; (2) it hedges against an enemy plan to use missile defense as one component of a 1st strike posture; and (3) it is an effective way to make the costs of missile defense unaffordable to an enemy. This last point is illustrated in a chart located at http://www.abolishnukes.com/charts/missile_defense_economics.html It shows graphically how MIRVing can drive missile defense costs to astronomical, unaffordable levels.
When warhead miniaturization made MIRV technology practicable in the mid-60's, the race to expand arsenals was on. About the same time, the nuclear superpowers were also pursuing missile defenses. Missile shield deployments contemplated by an enemy became another reason to rapidly MIRV arsenals. Fortunately, some visionaries could see trouble ahead. A MIRV-missile shield race was seen as pointless, unaffordable, and dangerous (if it provoked 1st strike instabilities). Wiser heads prevailed and an arms control solution was found. That solution was the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. By limiting ABM to just two sites per country, motives to MIRV arsenals were lessened (but not eliminated). Later, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process sought to eliminate all MIRVed missiles from nuclear arsenals. START II negotiations successfully established that goal, but treaty ratification was never completed because Russia attached ABM Treaty preservation as a ratification condition. The U.S. formally withdrew from the ABM Treaty on June 13, 2002 and Russia formally rejected START II the next day.
Today, the stage is set for a resurgent MIRV-missile shield competition. Russia has already issued warnings {26}; {27}. China has reasons to defeat missile defense in order to maintain some level of deterrent parity with the U.S. {8}. It is also believed China has acquired expertise to MIRV its long range missiles.
Once the action-reaction cycle gains momentum in a MIRV race, the specter of 1st strike posturing would likely return. In this way, missile defense is bound to aggravate the MIRV threat and damage national security.
Missile Defense Spurs New Arms Race
When then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen briefed NATO allies on missile shield plans in December, 1999, those plans were met with comments like "you're starting the arms race back up" {28}. The U.S. intelligence community agreed with this concern in its National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) issued in mid-year 2000 {29}. China has warned it will increase nuclear arsenals "ten-fold" if the U.S. deploys missile defenses {30}. Russia has asserted it will also upgrade and expand its nuclear arsenal {26}.
There is little doubt missile defense deployment will spur a new arms race. The previous discussion on MIRV connections to missile defense supports that assessment and explains the profound dangers of 1st strike posturing. The risks and stakes are high and many authorities on the subject might say they are unacceptably high.
Missile Defense Reverses Gains In Arms Control
Several important ways missile defense causes serious damage to national security have been mentioned:
(1) Astronomical program costs will steal resources needed to combat terrorism and WOMD proliferation;
(2) Missile defense deployment will spur new MIRV competition, leading to dangerous instabilities (including 1st strike postures); and
(3) Missile Defense will spur a new arms race and, therefore, new threats.
To this list must be added a forth important way: damage to arms control. Some might not agree this is a worthy and important concern. The contributions arms control make to national security are not appreciated by everyone. However, the unheralded achievements of arms control in the 20th century include (a) slowing WOMD proliferation and (b) halting the nuclear arms race between superpowers. Some probably appreciate that life in the 21st century might now be very much different if it were not for those great achievements. The "scorched earth" holocaust feared in the 20th century never materialized. Arms control has never been perfect, but it has always helped to save humanity from itself.
How does missile defense harm arms control? First, by spurring a new arms race, it thwarts progress towards arms control improvements. Second, it kills progress that has already been achieved. For example, Russia warned repeatedly it would withdraw from START II if the U.S. pursued missile defense {31}. As noted earlier, that withdrawal occurred last summer. START II was replaced by a new treaty, called Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which was a profound setback for nuclear arms control. Specific setbacks are tabulated in a chart available at http://www.abolishnukes.com/charts/new_nuclear_treaty_compromises_us_security.html A major problem with the new treaty is that it permits a new MIRV race which can occur in secret, thus, enabling a surprise breakout to a 1st strike posture.
Eventually, the fourth item on the list might do the most injury to national security. Missile defense damage to arms control could have far-reaching consequences. One possible scenario is a complete uprooting of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. That scenario is illustrated in a chart at http://www.abolishnukes.com/charts/road_map_to_nuclear_anarchy.html
This concludes discussion on why strategic missile defense must be considered a farce. It is not just a farce: it is a dangerous farce. The balance of this document gives evidence why missile defense is also a fraud. Such evidence underscores the ridiculous nature of the sham.
The strategic missile defense program has a long history, peppered with controversy. One notable episode illustrates both a significant flaw discovered during system testing and several deception tactics used to hide the flaw. This episode surfaced into public view after a senior engineer at TRW, Dr. Nira Schwartz, was fired for blowing the whistle on faked test data {32}. The data in question were from a June 1997 flight test in which the interceptor missile carried sensors to distinguish between decoys and real targets. Dr. Schwartz alleged test results had been faked to show sensors succeeded in sorting out decoys. Upon being fired, Dr. Schwartz filed suit against TRW and sent her technical findings to a noted missile defense critic, MIT Professor Ted Postol.
Dr. Postol examined the unclassified TRW data and concluded those interceptor sensors were incapable of distinguishing decoys. On May 11, 2000 he sent a letter to the White House to propose an independent, expert panel be appointed to investigate the fraudulent cover-up. About this time, a New York Times/CBS poll revealed public support for missile defense plummeted from 58% to 25% when poll respondents were asked their opinion "if many scientists conclude it is unlikely that such a system will ever work" {32}. Clearly, the Pentagon had reasons to quickly quash the Schwartz allegation and Postol audit proposal.
By May 19, 2000, the Pentagon had slapped a secret classification on Dr. Postol's letter and four attachments, effectively burying evidence of fraud {33}. The proposal for an independent technical audit was, in effect, stonewalled. Referring to the chart at http://www.abolishnukes.com/charts/missile_defense_farce_fraud.html, at least three different deception tactics were used to hide this one missile defense flaw.
There is a sequel to this story. Although Dr. Postol was stonewalled on his audit proposal, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) conducted an 18-month inquiry in response to a bipartisan request from Congress. {54}. The investigation report, released March 4, 2002, found evidence supporting Dr. Schwartz's contentions. Representative Howard Berman responded: "I commend Dr. Schwartz for having the courage to blow the whistle". Representative Charles Grassley added that Dr. Schwartzs' disclosures "appear to have sparked changes and improvements in a program that's vital to national security" {54}. It is clear such fraud can cause unacceptable damage to national security, especially if it remains concealed.
In point of fact, pursuit of strategic missile defenses is challenged by numerous "real-world" constraints {34}. Technical challenges are daunting enough. But, hiding problems makes matters worse, especially considering Congressional pressure on the Pentagon to quickly deploy a missile shield. That pressure results in development shortcuts which, in turn, usually cause schedule delays and cost overruns. Congress can hardly be blamed when it is denied candid information to guide its decisions. It sorely needs independent technical audit support such as has been historically provided by the National Academy of Sciences and the now-extinct Office of Technology Assessment. More on this later.
This discussion now takes up deception tactics used to hide major flaws. The chart at http://www.abolishnukes.com/charts/missile_defense_farce_fraud.html lists discussion topics for both the tactics and flaws.
Missile Defense Deception Tactics
The Schwartz/Postol case noted above illustrates three different tactics: secrecy, audit resistance, and stonewalling. Two additional deception tactics are misinformation and "smoke & mirrors". Skillful use of these tactics in various combinations can conceal flaws in any weapon system development. Deception has a long history in the defense industry and some cases which have surfaced in the public media will be mentioned. How many fraud cases are never exposed for public scrutiny? It is a "Catch-22" situation: efficient deception will keep the media and public from knowing the full extent of fraud. The media can attempt to reveal fraud, but how can it know when it is being manipulated by defense information sources to obscure fraud? This question is especially relevant to misinformation tactics: the media might be an unwitting party to concealing the truth.
Evidence of fraud hidden by secrecy is classic "Catch-22". When is classified information exposed publicly? Some classified information becomes declassified, but that information is no longer secret. As long as information stays classified it is unlikely to reveal fraud evidence. Thus, the case file on fraud concealed by secrecy is nearly empty.
The Schwartz/Postol case of fraud exposure (discussed earlier) is an exceptional case: fraud was publicly exposed before evidence was classified. (Interestingly, some of the evidence examined by Dr. Postol had been declassified earlier). In any case, this episode illustrates how secrecy is used to limit or suppress fraud exposure.
Occasionally news slips out which reveals the fact that information has been classified to hide system flaws. This was the case in April 1998 when the Pentagon report to Congress on the Persian Gulf war exposed serious weapon shortcomings under separate classified cover {35}. A similar incident occurred in May 1997 when a report intended "for internal use only" slipped out. The Pentagon had to admit high tech weapons performed poorly in actual tests {36}. This was not a case involving classified information, but it revealed intent to hide potentially embarrassing evidence. The Pentagon probably wished, in hindsight, the report had been classified secret when it was originally released. Secrecy is often used to hide embarrassing evidence, in addition to information which is truly sensitive with respect to protecting national security.
Recently, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has increased secrecy on its program activities {37}. It is restricting information on missile intercept tests, program timetables, and cost estimates...even to Congress. For example, it will not announce information on targets and decoys included in intercept tests. This has drawn fire from lawmakers. Senator Jack Reed: "There's a disturbing trend to not being forthcoming with the Missile Defense Agency" {37}. The general public should also be disturbed. Missile defense flaws and fraud evidence will become that much easier to conceal.
On March 9, 2001, an internal CIA document was declassified, revealing the Soviet threat had been greatly exaggerated from 1976 to 1986 {38}. Former CIA analyst Melvin Goodman charged the threat estimates were deliberately inflated to justify increased defense spending. Now teaching at the National War College, Goodman further claims one beneficiary of the inflated threat estimates was the SDI missile defense program, initiated in 1983.
Misinformation, intentional or not, is bad enough. But, to cover it up is plain fraud. Unfortunately for U.S. security, defense misinformation and cover-ups have a long history. Some of that history was revealed in a report released by the Government Accounting Office (GAO) in June 1993 {39}. Based on a 3-year study commissioned by the U.S. Senate, it blamed budget approval as motive to lie about weapon system performance and acquisition program performance. Major defense programs such as the B1B and B2 bombers and MX ballistic missile systems were cited. Other irregularities included understated costs and refusal to supply requested information {40}. This GAO report also charged the Pentagon with consistently exaggerating the threat.
Unfortunately, this 1993 GAO report revelation is not an isolated incident. Misinformation fraud continues to infect the defense industry. For example, a 1996 GAO study found the Pentagon was supplying misinformation on the performance of high tech weapon systems {41}. Specific to missile defense, announced results of a 1999 flight test were fudged to claim greater-than-achieved performance {42} and in January, 2000 the Pentagon admitted another missile defense test was not as successful as had been advertised {43}. Two questions might be asked of such misinformation: (1) how many hear the initial reports of success but not the later retractions? and (2) how much does such fraud boost the budgets allocated for missile defense?
The story on missile defense misinformation fraud continues. Blatant fraud was committed by the SDI program in the 80's. Tests were deliberately rigged to make progress appear much more advanced {44}. The excuse given was to fool the Soviet Union. But, of course, everyone else was fooled too, including lawmakers deciding SDI budgets. In this instance, Congress was kept in the dark for 10 years {44}.
This part of the story concludes with one final example of misinformation fraud. It is a classic example.
During and following the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Patriot system anti-missile success was heralded as outstanding {45}. The Pentagon eventually admitted it had overstated Patriot combat performance {46}. In fact, convincing evidence is still lacking that a single SCUD missile was killed by a Patriot interceptor. An Israeli Air Force report concluded "There is no evidence of even a single successful intercept (however) circumstantial evidence for one possible intercept "{47}. In this misinformation case, the gap between Pentagon hype and actual weapon system performance could not be greater. This fraud was concealed for years and a misled Congress probably thought outstanding Patriot success could be extrapolated to an effective national missile shield. Incidentally, the Pentagon fought public release of a 1997 GAO report criticizing exaggerated claims for weapon performance in the Gulf War, although the Pentagon managed to censor some key findings {45}.
The just mentioned efforts by the Pentagon to censor and stall a GAO audit report illustrates the extent to which program audits are resisted. Fortunately, the GAO won this battle, although the audit report did not escape Pentagon censorship of significant weapon performance short falls.
Another example of audit resistance is the stonewalling reception to Dr. Ted Postol's proposal for an independent investigation of questionable missile test data (discussed earlier). Even though the alleged fraud was eventually investigated by the GAO, the Pentagon still insisted the missile test performed as planned {48}.
A close cousin to audit accountability is oversight accountability. The Pentagon has recently launched an ambitious campaign to reduce Congressional oversight {49}. Critics say more oversight is needed, not less. Congressman John Spratt, Jr. says "It's of concern to me that this administration is asking for more money but less accountability". Former Congressional Budget Office (CBO) staffer Cindy Williams asserts "...this is an administration that for a year and a half has been consistently secret about everything and has a record of trying to preserve their secrets..." {49}. This drive to reduce congressional oversight portends even greater resistance to future audits.
There is no doubt missile defense activity is headed towards reduced oversight and audit cooperation. Even internal Pentagon audits of the missile shield program are now being resisted. A Washington Post story last February revealed the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has been granted exemption from key oversight functions {50}. These include system requirements specification; program costs and schedule reports; and oversight by the Pentagon's own Office of Operational Test and Evaluation (which has been critical of the missile test program). Such exemptions are highly unusual and the MDA is the only Pentagon agency being granted this protection {50}. The "Rumsfeld Curtain" will likely reduce MDA program transparency to near zero.
When all else fails, weapon system fraud can be disguised by "smoke & mirror" tactics. Various tricks can obscure the truth. For example, when GAO investigated the 1997 missile test case (Schwartz/Postol discussed earlier), the Pentagon refused to admit any wrongdoing {48}. Instead, it claimed the 1997 test was irrelevant because a new contractor had been selected to supply interceptor sensors. Unless a skeptical public can recognize the dodge, the Pentagon has succeeded in damage control from fraud exposed by the GAO report.
Another "red herring" trick for hiding flaws is making a false claim unrelated to the issue and unlikely to be challenged. An example of that smoke screen is an excuse once used to explain the dumb down of missile tests. In this case, previous missile tests had failed because multiple decoys were used. The explanation given for dumbing down to one decoy per test in the future was because the missile threat had changed {51}. An unskeptical public does not challenge this spurious claim and the smoke screen works to obscure sensor problems in sorting decoys from real targets.
One "smoke & mirrors" trick is to change weapon system nomenclature. Not long ago there was "national missile defense" and "theater missile defense". Now there is a new hodge-podge of variously-named system components. This new hodge-podge defies description of a coherent system architecture or of specific mission objectives and requirements. This situation is ideal for keeping critics and auditors at bay. If the concept balloon is pushed at one point, it can simply change shape. What shape is it supposed to have? No one is telling.
Even Congress is being stonewalled by the Pentagon, as mentioned under the "Audit Resistance" discussion. Also mentioned previously was the stonewalling reception to Ted Postol's proposal for an independent investigation of missile test fraud.
One form of stonewalling is refusal to participate in face-to-face debates with missile defense critics. Senator Joe Biden discovered this when he tried to schedule several debates in year 2000. Of course, that was an election year and politics were no doubt a factor.
Nearly all public debate on missile defense is merely a series of one-sided, assertive statements, either pro or con. Face-to-face debates where opposing positions can be clarified and coherently compared in constructive exchanges are rare, indeed.
When the missile defense debate started to heat up in the spring of 2001, Senator Tom Daschle declared the Bush administration had begun "one of the most important and consequential debates we will see in our lifetime" {52}. That prediction seemed reasonable as public debate continued through the summer. Even on the eve of September 11 the debate was running hot. The tragic events on September 11 ended this controversy and the missile defense debate has yet to resume. There have been calls for that debate. For example, William Hartung, senior fellow at the World Policy Institute, suggested in January 2002: "A national debate about the underlying purpose of missile defense...needs to start now" {53}. But such calls have so far been unheeded.
If, and when, the debate resumes it is unlikely the Pentagon or defense contractors will make spokespersons available for face-to-face debates. It is much less likely these missile defense advocates would sponsor or promote such debate. Do they have something to hide? Are they stonewalling the public?
This concludes the discussion on deception tactics. Cleverly orchestrated combinations of these tactics allow the missile defense program to get away with fraud. Impaired national security is the ultimate result of that fraud.
Major Flaws in Missile Defense
Because major system and program flaws are obscured by various deception tactics, it usually requires professional expertise to see through the deceptions. This means it would be especially difficult for those outside the defense industry or scientific/engineering professions to understand what flaws exist and what they mean. Fortunately, non-governmental efforts in those professional communities work to analyze missile defense system development. Their reports usually surface in the media, especially the print media {55} {56}. Unfortunately, many such reports appear in publications having limited distribution and limited public appeal. National television news will report a missile test success or failure but this is only the tip of the evidence iceberg. Most of the evidence goes unnoticed.
Strategic missile defense programs have already spent over $100 billion (current dollars) so far and still have not fielded any operating defense capability. Worse, the needed technologies are still unproven, to the extent that system architecture design is still premature. No one knows yet what the final system would look like; how well it would perform in combat; or how much it would cost over the long run. All this adds up to colossal failure of historic proportions. The situation today is not much improved (if at all) over that in 1983, when President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). One might conclude the strategic missile defense concept, itself, has been fundamentally flawed from the beginning.
Current system development is plagued by major flaws: costs overruns; technical risks; testing irregularities, etc. Evidence of these flaws in illustrated by some specific examples.
Life cycle cost (LCC) for a weapon system usually includes all research and development; system manufacture; deployment (basing); and 20 years operations and maintenance. Cost components include equipment acquisition, personnel, basing facilities, consumables re-supply, etc. Those are examples of parameters that drive LCC estimates and they depend heavily on what assumptions are made. Space-based systems LCC, for example, would depend on such parameters as orbital altitude; number of satellites per constellation (to maintain line-of-sight coverage); launch cost rate ($/lb.); how often satellites need to be repaired, refueled, and/or replaced; etc., etc. LCC estimation for complex weapon systems is not an appropriate task for amateurs.
In May, 1996, Congressional Republicans were preparing a bill demanding a national missile defense system which they calculated could be built for $5 billion or less {57}. Then the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released a cost estimate of $60 billion .... 12 times greater than the GOP estimate. The bill was quickly withdrawn before it came to a vote.
Several lessons can be drawn from this episode. First, missile defense costs have a bearing on system feasibility, including political feasibility. Second, cost estimates can vary widely, depending on who is doing the estimating. Third, cost figures can be misleading...the $60 billion did not include 20 years operations and maintenance. Total LCC were apparently not estimated (perhaps because LCC might have made the development costs look much smaller by comparison).
A basic problem with forecasting life cycle costs for strategic defense is that the system configuration is still unknown. An MDA spokesman, complaining about a January, 2000 CBO estimate of $238 billion, said "It's too early to start using these numbers...you don't know whether any of these programs will ever be deployed" {58}. It is worth noting the Pentagon admits it still does not have an integrated system design. It does not even know which system components will be included in the final configuration. There is probably good reason: the defense technologies are still not proven!
The possibility of life cycle cost growth to $1 trillion or more is not out of the question. First, there is MIRV growth to consider in the arsenals of other nuclear powers (discussed earlier). The MIRV competition could easily drive costs to astronomical levels. Second, other countermeasures such as decoys can drive those costs faster and higher (decoys are lighter than warheads). Third, all system components would need to be hardened and protected from physical attack, including space-based components. Senator Joe Biden was on the right track when he once speculated strategic missile defense could cost up to one-half trillion dollars {5}.
Strategic missile defense seems headed towards the same destiny as France's infamous Maginot Line. The system would likely never be completed because astronomical costs would make it unaffordable. At least the Maginot Line could boast formidable defenses, whereas it is highly doubtful the U.S. missile defense system will ever prove formidable. The U.S. system could be easily defeated.
Unproven Technology and High Tech Risks
While the missile defense debate was gaining steam in spring, 2001, the Washington Post ran a story on some of the technology issues and shortfalls {59}. President Bush had conceded in a speech two days earlier that there are "technological difficulties" to resolve before deploying a missile shield. One critic charged the President was talking about "systems that don't work to deal with threats that don't exist" {59}. An issue raised in the Post story was immaturity of system architecture design...no doubt resulting from immature technology development. Symptoms of these technology hurdles are manifested in cost overruns, schedule delays and system test failures. An internal Pentagon report released March 2, 2001 from the Office of Operation Test and Evaluation identified specific technical challenges and especially faulted the missile defense test program {60}. Technical hurdles are also reported from time-to-time in aerospace industry publications but generally heard only by a limited and specialized audience {61}.
One strategic missile defense program struggling with obstacles is the space-based component needed to detect missile launches and to track warheads while in the mid-course phase of ballistic trajectory. Called Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), it has two parts: a constellation of satellite sensors in low earth orbit (SBIRS-low) and a second constellation in higher orbits (SBIRS-high). But, over budget and behind schedule, both SBIRS-low and SBIRS-high have risked cancellation {62}; {63}. Adding to program troubles was an internal Pentagon report questioning whether SBIRS could distinguish decoys from real warheads. Congressman John Spratt was convinced SBIRS was "an essential component if ballistic missile defenses are to work effectively". A MDA spokesman claimed SBIRS cancellation "would degrade the future capability of the overall missile defense program" {62}
Actually, all the space-based components of the proposed missile shield are technically challenged. Air Force Secretary F. Witten Peters commented in mid-2000 "...we don't foresee weaponization in space between now and the 2020 timeframe" {64}. The reason, he explained, is because space missions were more costly and less effective than when accomplished by airborne platforms. He added "we really don't have, at the moment, on-going programs to weaponize space other than what is in the farthest reaches of our laboratories". Evidently, the technical challenge for military space system research is to demonstrate better cost-effectiveness than mission platform alternatives. SBIRS-high engineering and development, originally projected to cost $1.8 billion, now needs another $2 billion {63}. Production, deployment and operational costs of that system are yet to come.
Every missile defense program audit, both in-house and external, has rated technical and schedule risks as high. This becomes no more apparent than when examining system test problems (discussed in the next section). Missile defense proponents would have the public believe the needed technology is already in hand or technical risks are low. However, significant technical flaws and risks should be openly acknowledged. Otherwise national security will ultimately suffer.
Rigged & Unrealistic System Tests
A prominent group of physicists, the American Physical Society, has questioned technical feasibility of strategic missile defense on grounds system development tests are inadequate {65}. The group concludes these tests "fall far short of those required to provide confidence" in system feasibility. A primary concern is insufficient testing of penetration countermeasures that might be used to foil a missile shield.
This authoritative criticism is a recurrent theme in questions raised about missile defense testing. Other authoritative critiques fault the testing as too simplistic or even rigged to help make a successful intercept {66}; {67}. An example of rigging is to place a beacon on the target to make certain an interceptor can get close enough to engage the target. This practice is even acknowledged by MDA officials and they say it will be used in future system tests {67}. Congress is partly to blame. The Senate rejected a measure in June 2000 to toughen missile defense testing {68}.
Part of the problem in assessing system test performances is sorting true information from misleading information. Exaggerated claims for Patriot system performance in the Gulf war and deliberately faked sensor test data in the Schwartz/Postol case (discussed earlier) are examples of corrupted information. Those are not the only examples. When an intercept test in March 1999 failed to destroy the target, it was still heralded a success. Reporters were told 16 of 17 test objectives were achieved {42}. One month later the Pentagon confessed only 2 of 4 objectives had succeeded. A similar case followed soon after. This time there was a test result cover-up on an October, 1999 test which was not revealed until the next year. Interceptor sensors had mistakenly used a decoy to find the "warhead" target {69}.
In a more recent example, a missile defense test of a ship-fired interceptor was declared a success, even though the Pentagon admitted test conditions were not realistic {70}. It seems claims for success should be reserved for realistic test situations. Otherwise, policy and budget decisions might be misled.
Until recently, missile defense test activity was being monitored and analyzed by an "Inspector General" organization within the Pentagon. The Office of Operational Test & Evaluation (OT&E) released detailed reports assessing system development progress and shortfalls. OT&E also made recommendations on how system testing could be improved and whether system components were ready to move up the development ladder. Those OT&E reports have provided excellent visibility on research and development status. But, as mentioned earlier, much of missile defense activity has now been exempted from OT&E oversight. Thus, prospects are currently not good for missile defense test accountability to either Congress or the public sector. Congress should insist on periodic and independent technical audits, such as by the National Academy of Sciences.
Under the guise of "keeping all options open", it is claimed missile shield development has not progressed sufficiently to permit system cost estimation (see discussion on life cycle costs). That is hard to believe for a program already drilling interceptor missile silos for deployment beginning in 2004. This simply does not add up.
The actual status of missile shield design development is hard to pin down. For example, an MDA spokesman declared recently that it is not known which system components under development, if any, will be included in the deployment shield {58}. Last year a Washington Post reporter was led to believe "options under consideration remain very broad" {59}. The previous day Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld had indicated this was the case: "There's no question but that the use of land and sea and air and space are all things that need to be considered". As noted in the discussion of "Smoke & Mirrors" tactics, this hodge-podge of options is ideal for keeping critics and auditors at bay.
Logic would dictate one of two general possibilities represent the truth:
Possibility No. 1: System design options have been selected and an integrated system architecture can be specified (eg: cost estimation is not premature).
Possibility No. 2: System design options are still open and an integrated system architecture remains undefined (eg: cost estimation is premature).
If Possibility No. 1 is true, then the MDA lies are an outrageous fraud.
If Possibility No. 2 is true, then an undefined system architecture is a colossal flaw and premature system deployment is outrageous. MDA asserts No. 2 is the truth.
Giving MDA the "benefit of doubt", it is assumed missile shield architecture remains undefined. Clearly, overall system architecture cannot be specified until system components are selected. This probably means detailed performance requirements for the shield are still unknown. It certainly means detailed interface design specifications for system components are a long ways off.
Weapon system acquisition and system engineering development are highly structured processes. Mission and performance requirements for a system are carefully established long before procurement decisions are made and a very long time before system deployment begins. Specification of an integrated system architecture is an important development milestone and its detailed refinement is a long, evolutionary process. Technology readiness issues are resolved long before system components are selected and integrated design begins. This is, of course, good systems engineering practice. When shortcuts are taken, troubles abound.
Missile shield deployment by 2004 is an outrageous goal if the system architecture is truly undefined. Research tests to establish technology readiness are still in progress, so it should be no surprise the final system configuration is unknown. Pouring concrete and steel into Alaskan soil now for an initial operating system is both foolish and wasteful.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the missile shield scheme is its vulnerability to enemy countermeasures. That is, the shield can be easily defeated by simple tricks. Many such tricks were identified near the beginning of this document and are not recalled here. Countermeasures are the "Achilles heel" of strategic missile defense.
The missile defense program has been hiding this major flaw with tricks of its own. A principal deception tactic is stonewalling: the realistic threat from countermeasures has never been publicly acknowledged. Another tactic is misinformation on flight test results, as discussed under the misinformation topic. Decoys have been especially troublesome, so tests have been rigged by placing a beacon on the target. Finally, missile defense research tests have avoided stressful countermeasures.
One topic not covered yet is space-based weapons vulnerability to enemy countermeasures. The "holy grail" of missile shield advocates, space-based weapons have both electronic and physical vulnerabilities {71}. One Air Force exercise simulated attacks on space systems to analyze those vulnerabilities. Satellite electronics can be jammed or blinded; anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles can disable or destroy satellites; and ground support stations can be disabled by physical attack or by computer hackers. Those threats are not easily and cheaply countered. Reliance on space assets to support a missile shield involves risks which could be unmanageable.
Defense programs over the years to build and deploy strategic missile defenses can be summed up as a classic boondoggle. The results of over $100 billion expenditures with no operational system yet speak louder than words. While not a system flaw, per se, program management and execution can certainly contribute to flawed systems. Even strong supporters of missile defense have been highly critical of Pentagon program performance.
Some of the sharpest criticism of the program has come from an unlikely source. An "independent" panel of experts, chartered by the Pentagon, issued three harsh assessments in the period of February, 1998 to June, 2000 {72}. Headed by retired four-star General Larry Welch, the "blue ribbon" group labeled the program a "rush to failure" in its first report {73}. Especially significant, the Welch panel is both friendly to missile defense development and was given extensive access to secret information {74}. The second panel report charged "There is a legacy of over-optimism about the state of progress in developing reliable hit-to-kill performance" {75}. It also warned the program remains risky in technical terms {76}. The panel's third report expressed serious reservations regarding system test realism, including simplistic decoy countermeasures and limited test geometry. Among technical development issues, this report asserted "There are still high-risk software and hardware challenges in moving from legacy or prototype program elements to production configurations and converging them into an integrated system" {72}.
Independent GAO program audits have echoed the Welch panel concerns. A 1997 GAO report identified technical and schedule risks {77} and a May, 2000 report repeated that assessment. The latter report warned "performance and schedule risks remain significant because of the technical challenge, test limitations and the ambitious schedule" {72}.
Since these Welch panel and GAO reports, there is new evidence the development program continues to flounder {78} {79} {80}. This boondoggle, spanning nearly 20 years since SDI inception, continues to fizzle. "Poor program performance" is an understatement.
This concludes the fraud section covering deception tactics and major flaws. Taking the fraud and farce discussions together, it is hard to avoid the notion that the U.S. is making a big mistake in its stubborn pursuit of strategic missile defense. This mistake has already extracted a terrible price from bone fide defense against real threats to the nation. Let us hope this mistake is corrected soon.
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