Donald C. Whitmore
U.S. nuclear arms policy is currently adrift in a sea of global security threats. Worse, current policies stand in the way of robust defenses against nuclear weapons proliferation - probably the greatest threat to U.S. and world security. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other elements of the nonproliferation regime are put at risk by the stubborn attachment of the nuclear powers to large nuclear arsenals and advanced warheads research. Meanwhile, ineffective control of nuclear proliferation raises the specter of regional nuclear wars and nuclear terrorism. Recent nuclear tests on the Indian subcontinent moved Senator Daniel Moynihan to warn "the world is on the edge of nuclear warfare". At the very least, the uninvited entry of India and Pakistan into the nuclear weapons club casts a long shadow over nonproliferation prospects. Also, Harvard scholar Graham Allison has warned "we have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear terrorism against American targets".
The twin threats of regional nuclear wars and nuclear terrorism still lurk on the horizon but a horrific disaster before the turn of the century cannot be ruled out. Meaningful hopes for disarming those threats seem in retreat. If security policy authorities have workable plans for negating those threats, they are a well-kept secret. Even the need for major policy redirection appears unrecognized.
Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. is a notable exception among qualified policy experts. An authority in strategic nuclear issues and arms control, he has defined practical steps to address current realities. Unfortunately, his proposals are at odds with official policy and predominant thinking. For example, he suggests that to persuade responsible behavior among nuclear wannabees, the nuclear powers should move towards reducing arsenals to a few hundred warheads. Other experts agree. However, this would require near abandonment of nuclear deterrence policy -- a central feature of national security regimes. Reductions to that level would require a paradigm shift in strategic thinking.
But aren't the nuclear powers reducing arsenals? Yes and No. Some reductions have occurred under the START I Treaty but deep reductions await START II, III, and beyond. Also, the accomplished reductions are reversible under current policy. Nuclear cores of dismantled warheads are being stored for possible use in new warheads, including those that might be needed to increase current arsenals. The 1994 Nuclear Posture Review established maintenance of that option as a hedge against future uncertainties. A recent Presidential Decision Directive declared the need for nuclear deterrence indefinitely.
But isn't nuclear deterrence needed to assure national security? Some think not. Would nuclear arsenals deter a madman or fanatic? Probably not. Can nuclear deterrence guarantee protection against miscalculation, poor judgment, or inadvertent accident? Certainly not. Nuclear deterrence does not eliminate the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. Neither does it minimize those threats because continued reliance on nuclear arsenals tends to encourage further proliferation.
Nuclear risks are escalating out of effective control. Russia has questionable protection against theft of its nuclear arsenal and fissile material stockpile. Nuclear terrorism remains a serious, almost silent, threat and recent bombings in East Africa suggest increasing determination by those who attack U.S. interests. Nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan could undermine the fragile nonproliferation regime. For instance, the NPT likely has both reduced credibility and increased vulnerability.
Ambassador Graham is right. The nuclear powers must do more in making convincing progress towards abolishing nuclear arms. An effective nonproliferation regime depends on it. Bringing India, Pakistan, North Korea, and others into a world community that forswears nuclear arms depends on it. Minimizing nuclear terrorism risks depends on it.
However, some evidently believe the nonproliferation regime is broken beyond repair. Such despair will be self-actualizing if allowed to obstruct actions needed to build a robust regime. One example is the foot-dragging by the U.S. Senate in ratifying the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
It is time to defuse the nuclear threats. The choice is essentially between uncontrolled nuclear weapons proliferation and accelerated progress towards nuclear disarmament. A nuclear catastrophe may prove unavoidable as the future unfolds, but urgent review of nuclear policy followed by decisive actions can minimize nuclear risks.
November 17, 1998