Donald C. Whitmore
Mistaken launch of a nuclear weapon, due to a "Y2K" computer error, is an uncertain possibility. Until arsenals can be certified safe, hair-trigger alerts should be canceled. The U.S. and Russia are currently postured to "launch-on-warning" over 5000 nuclear warheads. Could a computer glitch next January 1 cause a false warning or unintended launch command? The odds may be small but the consequences are outrageously unacceptable. Nuclear powers should be pressed to take nukes off the dangerous alert. Why take unnecessary risks?
De-alerting nuclear arsenals is a good idea even if "Y2K" were not a concern. False warnings of missile attack and other crisis situations have a long history but nuclear exchanges were luckily avoided. How long can we count on luck to protect us from a mistaken nuclear disaster?
A new grassroots movement is underway to reduce nuclear risks caused by keeping weapons in quick launch readiness. Citizens can help by urging policy makers to at least temporarily cancel hair-trigger alerts.
Nuclear Dangers After the Cold War.
Nuclear risks did not end with the Cold War. Global nuclear stockpiles still exceeded 36,000 weapons in 1996. Those massive arsenals are ready to be used and a cataclysmic exchange is still possible, even if remote. Not only are most these warheads ready, but over 5000 weapons can be launched within a matter of minutes. The "Cold War" fear of a preemptive first strike still governs this dangerous alert policy. Weapons can be launched on warning - within minutes of detecting a supposed attack. The time available for attack verification and deciding whether to launch a retaliatory strike is squeezed into a few, fateful minutes (before enemy missiles are calculated to reach their targets).
A chilling incident of this kind occurred in 1995. Russian officials came within four minutes of having to decide whether to launch an immediate retaliatory attack on the U.S. President Yeltsin's "black suitcase" was activated for the first time in history. The incident was triggered by Russian radar detection of a missile launch and military commanders took eight minutes to determine that it was not an attack. The crisis was caused by a scientific rocket launched from Norway. World War III was avoided on a four-minute margin.
The world has been on the brink of nuclear war several times. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis is well-known. Later U.S. incidents (1979 and 1980) were caused by a computer failure and human error. Human and computer fallibilities are a dangerous mix when joined by "launch-on-warning". Mistakes do happen. NATO bombing of China's embassy in Belgrade is a recent example.
Y2K Concerns.
When January 1, 2000 arrives, many computers will reset internal clocks to the year 1900. This so-called "Y2K" problem has nearly everyone worried - many are beginning to hoard cash and other supplies. Government agencies are scrambling to make computer systems immune to the problem, including the Pentagon. Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre has testified "The year 2000 problem ... is going to have implications ... that we can't even comprehend".
Could a computer error cause a false attack warning or an unintended nuclear launch in either the Russian or U.S. arsenal? In some other arsenal? No one knows for certain. It would be prudent to take all nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert - at least until all arsenals can be certified safe.
De-alerting Fundamentals
The basic idea behind nuclear de-alerting is to increase the time between a weapon launch decision and an actual weapon launch. This time delay provides a needed safety margin to reduce chances of mistaken or unauthorized actions. Various technical and policy measures can give that safety margin. An example is removal of nuclear warheads from delivery systems (bombers/missiles). This is probably the simplest, most reliable safeguard. It is also standard policy for U.S. bombers and believed to be true for China's nuclear missiles.
De-alerting measures can be reversed so that these safeguards can be removed if the the need arises. But, time and difficulty for reversal can vary considerably. When warheads are removed, they could be stored near their delivery systems or at a remote location, say, several days transit-time away. Another de-alerting measure, called "pit stuffing" can also have variable reversal time. The pit stuffing safeguard disables a warhead by inserting a wire into the nuclear core (the wire prevents a nuclear detonation). If the end of the wire is left exposed, it can be quickly removed. If the wire end is also pushed into the nuclear core, then removal would likely require lengthy remanufacture of the warhead.
Additional safeguards include removing batteries from missile guidance systems; pinning open missile motor ignition switches; removing pneumatic systems that open missile silo covers; covering missile silo covers with mounds of earth; foregoing rapid launch of submarine missiles (e.g., by delaying removal of flood plates from launch tubes); and installing time-delay locks in launch control systems
Nuclear de-alerting is complementary to arms control objectives and can be verified by means established under existing arms control agreements. Also, President Bush set an example for unilateral de-alerting initiatives near the end of the Cold War. Russia reciprocated within a week.
Strong Support.
There is strong support for nuclear de-alerting among experts and policy makers. Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle is "convinced that it is time to seriously consider de-alerting at least a portion of our strategic ballistic missiles ...". Bruce Blair and other experts have concluded " The chance of an accidental launch could be reduced much more rapidly by "de-alerting" the missiles, increasing the amount of time needed to prepare them for launch. The U.S. and Russia should move independently down this path to a safer world, preferably taking quick strides in parallel." Senator Bob Kerrey observes "Our national security will not be endangered by leaders having two days, rather than two minutes, to make life-and-death decisions about nuclear war... "
Citizens can take action by writing or calling the President or contacting their congressmen. Letters to editors can also be effective. Experts may also be available to speak at meetings or other community events. Additional information can be obtained from the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability (www.ananuclear.org). The clock on the Y2K problem is running. The time for action is now.
May 11, 1999