April 10, 1998
Donald C. Whitmore
How nuclear weapons proliferation is connected to U.S. Senate decision whether to support ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Introduction
New nuclear threats are approaching America's doorstep and the U.S. Senate may be about to open the door. Why? Because most of the Senate does not yet make the connection between the new threats and their actions on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Too bad. Someday the U.S. Senate could be blamed for inviting nuclear disaster.
Sound far-fetched? Consider this. Harvard scholar Graham Allison warns "we have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear terrorism against American targets".[1] And nuke terrorism is not the only new threat to U.S. citizens. Radioactive fallout from regional nuclear wars would be carried by winds across U.S. borders. That proliferation threat is also increasing. On March 18, 1998, the Hindu nationalist Government in India announced plans to review nuclear arms policies and then decide whether to "exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons" [2]. This announcement by the new ruling party promises increased tensions between India and Pakistan. It also reminds the world that India and Pakistan were probably on the brink of atomic war in 1990 [3]. The awful specter of regional nuclear wars is drawing closer to reality.
The Senate is currently in no hurry to schedule CTBT ratification hearings. There are also no guarantees the treaty will survive a ratification vote. The Senate is now "standing-by" as the proliferation threat approaches U.S. borders -- seemingly unaware of its urgent role in helping to turn away that threat.
The U.S. Senate will likely miss the connection between nuclear weapons proliferation and CTBT ratification because it has not been given an adequate explanation. The Senate cannot be expected to see how its actions (or inactions) could threaten U.S. security. Administration officials have frequently stressed the importance of the CTBT to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other nonproliferation measures, but have not provided careful explanations.
This document supplies some of the missing story needed to understand the urgency of CTBT ratification. Missing "chapters" include (1) an unvarnished description of the proliferation threat; (2) potential consequences of the U.S. Senate decision; and (3) the real stakes in the ratification debate.
Nuclear Proliferation Threat
The nuclear proliferation threat to U.S. and global security is worse than generally understood. Top government officials no doubt have a solid understanding but may be reluctant to reveal details behind their concerns. They may not wish to admit that available counters to the threat are limited. They may fear causing public panic. They may also underestimate the public. Nearly everyone knows something about "loose nukes" from the former Soviet Union. The public might not be familiar with all the details but it has been told many times the threat is significant.
A recent poll showed 70% support for the CTBT which could indicate the public sees how the treaty reduces proliferation risks [4]. Many understand the nuclear war threat between superpowers has been replaced by possibilities for localized nuclear wars and nuclear terrorism. They probably know such disasters are more likely to actually happen, compared to the "Cold War" threat of massive nuclear warfare.
Awareness of the nuke threats does not assure that threat severity is fully appreciated. Many may not want to understand that terrible threat! Still, senators need to appreciate the full scope of the threat as they grapple with what to do about CTBT ratification. An overview of the nuclear proliferation threat is given in Appendix (A).
Potential Consequences of CTBT Ratification Decision
The second chapter in the missing story concerns how the CTBT affects nuclear proliferation. Government officials are well aware of the CTBT's importance to reducing the proliferation threat and are pressing for Senate support. Secretary of State Madeline Albright stated in a February 10, 1998, letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the CTBT "....can hinder both the development and spread of new and more dangerous weapons" [5]. Secretary of Defense William Cohen urged CTBT ratification in a February 3 letter to the Senate Armed Services Committee [5]. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Henry Shelton also endorsed ratification in a February 5 letter to the House Committee on National Security [5].
Two recent White House papers have focused on how the CTBT contributes to U.S. national security and why ratification is linked to proliferation control [6] [7]. However, these papers do not adequately explain the connection. For example, mention is made of the connection to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. But, the connection is not explained in the detail needed to understand and appreciate the urgency of CTBT ratification. This document and the cited references supply the needed background.
A global test ban does help counter nuke proliferation but, more importantly, failure to ratify the CTBT could do considerable damage to the nonproliferation regime. Ratification failure would impact U.S. leadership in nonproliferation initiatives and would especially impact the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Understanding this latter point requires some explanation of NPT history and how non-nuclear nations view NPT commitments. That part of the story is told in Appendix (B). The connection between the CTBT and NPT must be understood to fully appreciate the potential consequences of ratification failure.
A U.S. ratification failure (or undue delay in voting on the treaty) could conceivably kill both the CTBT and the NPT. Fallout from a CTBT failure is examined under three scenarios: "best case"; "worst case"; and "probable case". But, first, the consequences of CTBT ratification success are discussed.
Consequences of CTBT Ratification Success
When the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was being negotiated in the mid-1960s, the CTBT was viewed as vitally important for controlling proliferation. That history is reviewed in Appendix (B). Thirty years later, the idea is still important but perhaps less convincing. It is now known that crude weapons can be made without testing (as demonstrated by South Africa and others). Also, the nuclear powers have developed methods for advanced warhead design that do not require nuclear explosions (so-called "subcritical" tests and calibrated computer simulations). Even so, the CTBT still has benefits for nuclear nonproliferation. Without underground nuclear tests, the nuclear powers would be unable to certify advanced warheads having a new "physics package". They would therefore be less interested in new warhead types. Non-nuclear powers would be more inclined to follow U.S. nonproliferation leadership than if the U.S. rejects the CTBT. U.S. leadership would probably encourage other nuclear powers to ratify the CTBT and to support other nonproliferation initiatives. Some net gain in reducing proliferation risks can be expected if the CTBT is ratified by the U.S. However, that gain may not be as important in comparison to the losses that could be suffered by ratification failure.
On the other hand, some argue that the CTBT would make proliferation matters worse [8]. One basis for this argument is that reduced confidence in the U.S. arsenal (caused by a perceived decline in reliability) might lead some nations to seek their own nuclear deterrent (if previously under U.S. nuclear "umbrella"). But this line of reasoning overlooks the fact that the U.S. is committed to resume nuclear testing if it cannot certify arsenal reliability. Formal certification is conducted annually. Also, an enemy could never depend on declining nuke reliability -- the arsenal would keep its full deterrent value. Now, the story turns to how a failure to ratify the CTBT could produce disastrous consequences.
Consequences of CTBT Ratification Failure
The "best case" is when new nuclear proliferation is least stimulated by CTBT failure and the least damage is done to the nonproliferation regime. The "worst case" motivates new proliferation to the severest extent and it does the most damage to the control regime. Somewhere between these extremes lies a "probable" scenario. Each of these cases is described.
"Best Case" Consequences
U.S. Senate rejection of the CTBT would probably kill the treaty. Appendix (B) should be read if there is any doubt of this result. Renegotiation of the treaty to soften it for U.S. acceptance is also unlikely. If U.S. ratification does not succeed then other nuclear powers would probably not ratify the CTBT. Non-nuclear powers would have no incentive to forswear nuclear testing. The "best case" is that the CTBT would die but with little impact -- perhaps under the excuse that the treaty "really did not matter anyway". In the best case, non-nuclear powers would stay committed to the NPT. To stay committed, the accountability measures negotiated at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, see Appendix (B), would likely have to be working to their satisfaction. The nuclear powers might also need to further demonstrate their commitment to nuclear disarmament (e.g., by agreement to some timetable -- now opposed in principle by the nuclear powers).
Even in the best case, the U.S. would lose much of its leadership position in countering nuclear proliferation. For example, China, North Korea, India, and Pakistan would be less inclined to respond to U.S. proddings. The new ruling party in India would be even less likely to reverse course from their current interest in reviewing nuclear policy. They might tilt further towards openly declaring nuclear weapons status. All potential consequences are difficult to imagine but in the "best case" there would be little meaningful impact. Some impact would be unavoidable. In the best case, the demise of the CTBT would not encourage runaway proliferation and it would leave the nonproliferation regime relatively untouched. But, like the "worst case" scenario, the odds are rather thin.
"Worst Case" Consequences
At the other end of the spectrum is a horrific future in which nuclear proliferation is totally out of control and the nuclear arms race resumes in full strength. START II & III arsenal reductions never materialize and are replaced by an arms spiral in which weapons of mass destruction become commonplace. Everyone needs an "ultimate" deterrent to protect from all other deterrents. Not a highly likely scenario but still possible. Consider the following chain of events. First, the CTBT is pronounced dead. Non-nuclear states immediately complain the nuclear powers are not really serious about nuclear abolition. They show their disapproval by withdrawing from the NPT. That ends international inspections of nuclear power reactors. Next, the nuclear weapon states sense new proliferation dangers and cancel all negotiations for arsenal reductions. Non-nuclear powers retaliate by threatening to build their own nukes. Now, everyone is becoming increasingly nervous. Nations, like Libya, who are not in a position to acquire N-arms, step-up secret production of chemical and biological weapons. The race to build weapons of mass destruction is now reaching fever pitch and international control regimes have totally collapsed. With it, chances for nuclear terrorism and other nuclear nightmares escalate from "remote" to "inevitable".
Is the "worst case" worth worrying about? The answer is yes. Although unlikely, the potential consequences are grossly unacceptable and must not be ignored. There are no guarantees that an uncontrollable nuclear arms spiral can be prevented. If the U.S. Senate fails to support CTBT ratification it exposes American society and the rest of the globe to an increase in that risk.
"Probable" Consequences
More likely consequences lie between the extreme scenarios. It is anyone's guess what would actually result from U.S. Senate rejection of the CTBT and that is part of the problem. Rejection has unpredictable consequences. However, a scenario will be described as "food for thought".
If the CTBT were pronounced dead, non-nuclear nations would probably not leave the NPT in droves. Some might abandon the NPT and their absence is certain to increase global nuclear risks. Many may stay with the NPT because they recognize its importance and would wish to salvage something from the "CTBT debacle". Those that stay would likely insist on extracting a price from the nuclear states. The first thing that might come to mind is a timetable for nuclear disarmament or perhaps bracketed time periods for specified arsenal levels. This could be a positive development for global security but it is not a result that can be counted upon.
If the U.S. kills the CTBT, India could say "I told you so". They have long claimed the nuclear powers have no honest commitment to nuclear disarmament. Many nuclear "wannabees" would probably agree and turn their backs on the nuclear powers. Control of the nuclear proliferation threat would be marginalized. This would cause more headwind for efforts to reduce nuclear arsenals. START II & III could become more distant and that development might further motivate would-be proliferants. A vicious circle could evolve that sweeps nations into an arms race nobody wants. Efforts to turn it aside would struggle under a damaged arms control regime. No one knows how this situation might playout but one thing is certain: There would be much greater uncertainty. The U.S. Senate should think about future burdens American citizens might have to bear if they stall ratification hearings indefinitely or vote down the CTBT.
Stakes in the Ratification Decision
The last chapter in the missing CTBT story is a description of the ratification stakes in human security terms. Nuclear proliferation risks are abstract until some nation launches a nuclear attack on another, or a terrorist detonates a nuclear device inside a large city. People live both inside and downwind of the target area. The CTBT ratification stakes involve human security as much as national security.
The global threat posed by partially-controlled nuclear weapons proliferation is difficult to put into perspective. But one aspect of that threat must be addressed: the human aspect. Technical, political, strategic, and economic aspects should not be allowed to preclude human aspects. What are the real stakes in the CTBT ratification decision? The real stakes are real people. Most Americans were not yet born when nuclear weapons were first used in the heat of war. Most have probably not read an account of the human suffering, such as in the book Hiroshima by John Hersey. Most are not fluent on nuclear weapons effects on humans and their surroundings. Few would be able to visualize a "flattened Manhattan" except in terms of structural devastation. People are in the target area of a nuclear attack and their great suffering is matched only by the great incapacity to give them relief. Few would be mentally prepared to witness news coverage of a nuclear terrorist attack against a population center. How can anyone prepare for such an event? Yet, those are the human stakes in the CTBT ratification debate. To ignore those stakes is to say human security is of no concern.
References for Main Text and Appendices
[1] _________ Aviation Week and Space Technology , Sept. 17, 1996, pp. 62-3
[2] Burns, John, "Hindu Party is Candid on Arms but Not Much Else" New York
Times, Mar. 19, 1998, pp.1,10 (further clarification, NYT, Mar. 28, p.4.)
[3] Editorial, "Disarming the Subcontinent", New York Times, Mar. 29, 1994,
p.A4
[4] Staff, "Treaty awaiting Senate action enjoys broad public support", Test
Ban News No. 9, (produced by the White House Working Group on the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty), March 4, 1998, pp. 1,2.
[5] Staff, "National security principals stress benefits of CTB Treaty", Test
Ban News No. 7 (produced by the White House Working Group on the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty), Feb. 19, 1998, pp. 1,2.
[6] Staff, "Treaty in our national security interests", Test Ban News No. 10,
(produced by the White House Working Group on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty)
March 13, 1998, pp. 1,2.
[7] Staff, "Senate hearings: CTBT strengthens efforts against would-be proliferators",
Test Ban News No. 11, (produced by the White House Working Group on the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty), March 20, 1998, pp. 1,2.
[8] Schlesinger, James, "Nukes: Test Them or Lose Them", The Wall Street Journal,
Nov. 19, 1997.
[9] Whitmore, Don C., "Characterization of the Nuclear Proliferation Threat",
Monograph Series on Security and Arms Control, April, 1993, p.8
[10] Broder, John M. "The Growing Fear of Nuclear Proliferation", Tacoma News
Tribune, Jan. 26, 1992, p.G1
[11] Whitmore, Don C., "Rationale For Comprehensive Test Ban", Monograph Series
on Security and Arms Control, Sept, 1993, p.29
[12] Whitmore, Don C., "Rationale For Nuclear Disarmament" ,Vol.II, Monograph
Series on Security and Arms Control, Mar., 1995, p.17
[13] Quester, George "No-First-Use and Nonproliferation:Redefining Extended
Deterrence", Washington Quarterly, Mar., 1994, pp103-114
[14] __________"Upping the terrorism ante", USA Today, Mar. 21, 1995, p.8A
[15] Mitchell, Alison, "Trade Center bombing linked to U.S. policy", Seattle
Times, Mar. 28, 1993, p.1
[16] __________"U.N. Cannot Become Engaged in Every World Conflict", New York
Times, Sept. 28, 1993, p.A4
[17] Bradsher, Keith, "China Trade: Cash or Care?",New York Times, May 14, 1993,
p.1
[18] Schleifer, Yigal, "A startling upsurge in U.S. bombings", Seattle Times,
Aug. 7, 1996, p.B5
[19] Kifner, John, "Security Levels To Set a Record At the Olympics" New York
Times, July 12, 1996, p.1
[20] Liu, Melinda, "A Shadow Over the Olympics" Newsweek, May 6, 1996, p.34-5
[21] MccGwire, Michael, "Is There a Future For Nuclear Weapons?", International
Affairs, Apr., 1994, pp.211-228
[22] Williams, Phil, "The Real Threat of Nuclear Smuggling", Scientific American,
Jan., 1996, pp.40-44
[23] Zimmerman, Tim "Nuclear Stockpiles:Hot Property", U.S. News & World Report,
Oct. 23, 1995, pp.56-67
[24] _________ Aviation Week and Space Technology , Sept. 17, 1996, pp. 58-61
[25] same as [10]
[26] Whitmore, Don C., "Rationale For Nuclear Disarmament" ,Vol.II, Monograph
Series on Security and Arms Control, Mar., 1995, pp. 19; 57
[27] ibid, pp. 76-82
[28] Epstein, William, "Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: A
Means of Strengthening the Treaty", Virginia Journal of International Law, Winter,
1994, pp. 101-109
APPENDIX (A). Nuclear Proliferation Threat
The nuclear proliferation threat was summed-up in a 1993 monograph [9]:
"Today we face new and different horrors - -terrorist nuclear attacks on population centers (the "suitcase" scenario) or an epidemic of regional nuclear wars waged between historical enemies. The essence of today's problem is that nukes are spreading from the cautious control of a few superpowers into the not-so-cautious hands of even minor powers. Former CIA Director Robert Gates: These weapons are "all too often in the hands of megomaniacs, unstable military governments, strong men of proven inhumanity, weak and unstable governments, or in the hands of some who are threatened by such govern:ments" [10]
A second monograph, also published in 1993, described the linkage between a comprehensive test ban and nuclear proliferation [11]
"Many knowledgeable authorities on nuclear weapons proliferation have concluded the U.S. must act decisively to stop the spreading menace. Of these authorities, many are also well-versed on the technical and political aspects of nuclear weapon testing and they believe a U.S. test ban and determined support of CTB negotiations is the best possible way to demonstrate U.S. commitment to nonproliferation. This belief happens to coincide precisely with the official positions of nearly all signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Feelings on this issue run so strong that many believe halting nuclear proliferation is sufficient justification for an immediate and permanent ban on U.S. nuclear weapon testing."
A 1995 update on nuclear proliferation provided a broader context for the threat: [12]
"Now the nuclear threat has taken an ominous and bizarre new turn. Nuclear weapons proliferation is increasing chances of nuclear disaster, even though the probability of an all-out global conflagration remains small. Nuclear terror is taking on new meaning -- it has become much more an immediate threat. Two nuclear policy analysts explained the nuclear proliferation threat in the Spring 1994 issue of The Washington Quarterly: "Crises sometimes lead to 'a war nobody wanted' or to escalations that neither side can control. The risks that such deterrence failures would involve nuclear use are increased as more countries get nuclear weapons...Whatever hopes are now entertained for a disciplined world order and a reliable system of collective security thus depend on the halting of nuclear proliferation...nuclear proliferation casts a long shadow over regional and global security problems" [13].
The specter of regional nuclear wars, raised in the Introduction, is bad enough but a more immediate threat to the United States may be nuclear terrorism. There is already a history of direct terrorist threats to the U.S. Since the 1970's there have been scores of false alarms involving threats of nuclear weapons use. But, these each invoked responses by a special U.S. task force called "The Nuclear Emergency Search Team" [14]. Although no such threat has yet resulted in a nuclear incident there have been indications terrorist groups are still contemplating nuclear attacks [15]. There is also substantial evidence to prove nuclear materials and bomb-building skills in the former Soviet republics, North Korea, and elsewhere are not secure from possible terrorist's acquisition.
The full weight of this evidence has knowledgeable authorities worried. For example, in September 1993, President Clinton warned: "Growing global stockpiles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are raising the danger of nuclear terrorism for all nations" [16]. Also, he had earlier revealed a concern that China's exports of sensitive technologies could lead to terrorist nuclear bombings within ten years [17].
Bombings of New York City's World Trade Center, the Oklahoma City federal building and Saudi military barracks prove massive destructive intent by terrorists. Many innocent citizens have become victims of the escalating violence. Terrorist bombings in the United States nearly tripled between 1986 and 1994 and federal officials do not expect much relief from the growing trend. Professor Victor Le Vine, a specialist in terrorism and history at Washington University in St. Louis: "It's no longer (just) a weapon of mass destruction, but one of mass use" [18]. The potential for terrorist attacks during the 1996 Atlanta Olympics prompted security preparations costing over 300 million dollars [19] and they included a simulated nuclear attack drill. [20]
Let there be no mistake: The U.S. is directly threatened by nuclear terrorism. A Harvard University study entitled "Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy" concludes nuclear terrorism risks to the U.S. are increasing and "loose nukes" from the former Soviet Union "constitutes the most serious direct threat to vital U.S. interests today and for the foreseeable future" [1]. Further, the Harvard study, released in early 1996, finds that a terrorist group could, with a budget not exceeding a few hundred thousands dollars, be prepared in a matter of months to deliver a nuclear bomb [1]. Graham Allison, who led the study, has warned: "We have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear terrorism against American targets before this decade is out" [1]. Terrorists, themselves, underscore the direct threat to the U.S. Those claiming responsibility for the World Trade Center bombing (Feb. 26, 1993) threatened they "will continue to execute our missions against military and civilian targets" and they mentioned "nuclear targets" [15].
The spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations, so-called "horizontal proliferation", exacerbates nuclear terrorism risks because it can result in either deliberate or inadvertent supply of means for terrorist groups to wreak nuclear havoc. According to defense policy analyst Michael MccGwire: "...20-30 states (have)...the technological capacity to produce nuclear weapons" [21].
Nuclear proliferation concerns have been covered extensively in major newspapers and magazines. A Scientific American article in January 1996 concluded the nuclear smuggling threat is real and Russian arsenal security is lax [22]. U.S. News & World Report featured a cover story on nuclear smuggling in its Oct. 23, 1995 issue [23]. Aviation Week and Space Technology carried a series of articles on the subject in its June 17, 1996 issue. One article in that series paints this grim picture [24]:
"Officials say attacks on urban targets might easily result in civilian casualties from a few thousand 'to the low millions'. Paralysis and hysteria would overrun municipal and state governments, police and firefighters, hospitals and transportation. Food and water sources would be contaminated, power lost, medical supplies exhausted, vaccine stockpiles drained. An entire urban population could be brought to its knees and the federal government might face multiple and coordinated urban attacks across the country. The Pentagon and other federal agencies could be swamped with emergency demands for help at home, while fighting a regional war overseas".
The U.S. is working to combat nuclear proliferation and put a lid on nuclear smuggling across a wide range of separate, sometimes coordinated, efforts. For example, the U.S. fought hard for indefinite extension to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. However, today's tools for combating proliferation are only marginally effective. South Africa covertly developed a small nuclear arsenal that was unknown until disclosed by that government (coincident with announcement to implement nuclear disarmament). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) certified every year that Iraq was not diverting nuclear material for weapon development [25], yet Iraq had an extensive covert nuclear program until unmasked during post-Desert Storm inspections. Iraq had signed the NPT in 1968
As proliferation experts know, North Korea and Pakistan both have had covert nuclear weapon programs for years. Iran seems bent on secret nuke development and Israel demurs from acknowledging its clandestine arsenal. Libya, Algeria and Syria are also likely players in the covert game [26].
Ramzi Yosef, convicted for bombing the World Trade Center in New York City in February 1993, did not use quite enough high explosives to topple the 110-story office building. He killed six persons, injured hundreds, but came close to killing thousands. Would Yosef have used a nuke that day? Maybe. One can only wonder whether a future terrorist would resort to a nuclear attack. That concern has top government officials sufficiently worried to give high priority to counter-proliferation efforts. A low-technology atomic weapon smuggled into Manhattan could cause unimaginable devastation.
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has an unsettling connection to this threat picture. If the U.S. Senate rejects the CTBT, then immense damage will likely be done to efforts aimed at reducing nuclear proliferation risks. Could Senate rejection of the CTBT be ultimately responsible for nuclear nightmares becoming anguished realities? That is something to ponder in the yet-to-be-scheduled ratification hearings
APPENDIX (B). The CTBT Connection to the NPT
Note: Portions of this story were excerpted from Appendix 6.7 of Reference [27]
To set the stage, the 1995 NPT conference is first discussed. The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was held April 17 - May 12 at the U.N. headquarters in New York City. Atmospherics at the beginning were emotionally-charged and full of uncertainty. Although the global community was unanimous in desiring a successful outcome, differences over what constituted "success" threatened to destroy future treaty viability, if not the treaty's very existence. Such an outcome would likely eliminate any meaningful hope for effectively controlling nuclear proliferation and would have had disastrous consequences for international security. That much was generally agreed.
The NPT crisis had been brewing for many years and its roots can be traced to before the treaty was first signed on July 1, 1968. Delegates to the 1995 NPT conference were deeply divided on several major issues including whether and how to extend the NPT (then near expiration). Perhaps the most visible division was between those who favored indefinite (permanent) treaty extension and those who favored consideration of other extension options (tied explicitly or implicitly to demonstrated progress towards nuclear disarmament).
Old disputes were coming into play and the central issues regarded obligations of nuclear powers vis-a-vis those who abstained from seeking nuclear arsenals. The NPT extension debate was tied to festering disputes that had plagued all of the five-year periodic NPT review conferences. Consensus agreement to "concluding documents" failed at two of the four review conferences and narrowly passed at the other two conferences. The latest failure had been the 1990 NPT Review Conference following an unresolved showdown on the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) issue. Unfortunately this failure preempted enactment of many agreed improvements to the NPT regime.
The NPT was born out of compromise between competing interests. The overall bargain struck between nuclear states (NS) and non-nuclear states (NNS) was for NNS to forswear nuclear weapons in exchange for NS pledge to reduce and eliminate nuclear arms. Within this framework were a number of compromises on treaty duration, review, extensions, etc. Those historical expectations were shattered by events over the next 25 years after the treaty entered force: The NS had embarked on massive arsenal build-ups while the NNS remained frustrated in obtaining peaceful nuclear technology. The 25-year NPT history had disillusioned NNS expectations and the cumulative bitterness was poisoning NPT atmospherics.
During mid-1960s negotiations of the NPT, the NNS did not insist on specific NS performance towards disarmament, but they did make clear their specific expectations. Those expectations were stipulated in a "Joint Memorandum on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" submitted by eight non-aligned members in August, 1966. Five specific steps towards nuclear disarmament were identified [28]:
"[1] a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon testing, [2] a complete cessation of production of fissionable material for weapon purposes, both in themselves effective nonproliferation measures, [3] a freeze and a gradual reduction of the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, [4] the banning of the use of nuclear weapons and [5] assurance of the security of non-nuclear weapon States ".
These five objectives have been consistently applied by non-aligned nations as criteria for measuring whether the nuclear states are making satisfactory disarmament progress. Note that a CTBT tops the list.
The situation at the 1995 conference was laboring under sharp differences in opinion on whether the nuclear powers had met their NPT obligations. Some asserted the NS had satisfied all NPT obligations while some others asserted the NS had not satisfied any obligations. Many probably agreed the truth was somewhere between those two extremes .
Serious CTB negotiations had been resisted by the nuclear powers for most of the NPT's 25-year history. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers were perfecting technical means for circumventing the CTB's objective of precluding nuclear weapon design verification (via computer simulations and low-yield explosive tests).
For this and other reasons, many non-nuclear powers believed the NPT was not a fair bargain and nuclear disarmament had not been pursued in "good faith". They were concerned that if the NPT were extended indefinitely then effective leverage would be lost for persuading meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament.
All was not well at the 1995 NPT conference. All did not end well. Indefinite treaty extension was finally decided through a brilliant parliamentary maneuver orchestrated by the conference President. Consensus was never formally reached although there have been claims to the contrary. To avoid a completely bankrupt outcome, another bargain was struck to breath life into the faltering treaty. The terms of the bargain included the continuation of five-year reviews (next one in year 2000) and a process for assuring greater accountability by parties to the treaty. A central feature of the bargain was a promise by the nuclear powers to conclude negotiations of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The nuclear powers made good on their promise and the CTBT was opened for signature on September 24, 1996.
Still, the future of the NPT hangs in the balance. The first Preparatory Conference for the year 2000 review produced little -- progress towards the accountability mechanism was more in form than substance. Ratification of the CTBT is also proceeding slowly. Those nations that feel the NPT is still on probation may be ready to leave the treaty if there is not convincing progress soon.
With this background, imagine the consequences to the NPT if any nuclear power rejects the CTBT. Now, imagine the consequences of the United States, the most powerful nuclear party to the treaty, stalling ratification hearings or voting down the CTBT.
Some might question the actual value of the NPT in reducing nuclear proliferation risks. Many would agree the NPT is far from perfect and needs strengthening. However, the demise of the NPT is likely to signal the beginning of global nuclear anarchy. Regardless of its limitations and imperfections, the NPT regime is considered by many to be the cornerstone of international efforts to contain the spread of nuclear weapons. The CTBT is, and has been, a necessary prerequisite to NPT survival.
Still others might question the need for international help in defending U.S. national security. There seems to be a certain "moat mentality" that believes the "castle" of national security can be defended without help from the outside. Can the U.S. defend adequately against the nuclear proliferation threat by itself? Not likely. Appendix (A) should be read carefully if there is any doubt. The flow of illegal aliens and illegal drugs across U.S. borders should prove the borders are porous to weapons of mass destruction. Nukes could make their way to city centers following much the same routes.
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